China still calls the shots in Korea

As expected, China has refused to blame North Korea for the sinking of the warship Cheonan at a summit with the Japanese and South Korean leaders. Though China and North Korea both abandoned Marxism long ago, their ties still run deep enough for Beijing to keep an open mind on the incident.

However, as with almost every geopolitical situation these days, pragmatism  and not ideology is the motivation. At present, China benefits from its quasi-alliance with the DPRK in several ways and is not willing to destroy it to no benefit. War, which would destroy North Korea, would be catastrophic for several reasons.

First and foremost, China wants to avoid having an American-allied, unified Korea on its border. If that came to pass, China’s already questionable ability to respond to a Taiwanese declaration of independence would disappear altogether. Deterring the US navy from intervening in Taiwan would be one thing, dealing with an American force which had a land border with China another. The bad publicity that China inc. accrues as a result of its links with Pyongyang is worth keeping the US away from the border. A scenario where China and the Americans are fighting in Korea won’t happen in the foreseeable future but Beijing’s entire strategy revolves around long-term planningd and to ignore the value of having an ally in such a situation would be remiss in the extreme.

Secondly, the PRC props North Korea up because it simply couldn’t afford to let it collapse. If it did, China would have to cope with hundreds of thousands, if not million of refugees. Also, the impact of sudden reunification on the South Korean economy would be devastating and would in turn seriously damage China’s trade with Seoul. The regional economy would be destabilised and would take years to recover. Politburo members planning China’s rise to supremacy assume and desire no more big economic shocks and will avoid them happening on their doorstep at all costs.

Thirdly, North Korea gives the PRC leverage over the west and the Americans in particular. Selling more arms to Taiwan? Well, forget about us supporting anti-DPRK Security Council resolutions. Criticising our monetary policies? Don’t be surprised if a shipment of new tanks finds its way to the Korean People’s Army. All the big players use small countries as leverage against each other, and Pyongyang is more than happy to play the part. There is of course a risk that the tail could wag the dog, but as long as North Korea depends on China for fuel, food and money, it won’t overstep any lines China may draw in the sand.

The nature of the situation on the peninsula means there is always a risk of a war starting accidentally. One of the regular small-scale firefights on the DMZ could get out of hand. A new naval clash could escalate before either country’s government has a chance to calm the situation down. However, those dangers have existed since 1953, and all concerned parties have learned to live with it. The risks can be minimised but never eliminated completely. As long as the two countries are divided, war is always a possibility.

But it would take an accident or miscalculation to start a new war. No one, not even Kim or the US actually wants the situation to turn hot. Russia and China have both called for further investigations into the Cheonan incident, which means they are still hoping to delay any punishment the rest of the world may want to visit on DPRK. Moscow and Beijing may believe that if they can delay punitive action for long enough, tempers will cool and the incident can be largely consigned to the history books, along with the hundreds of other occasions when the two Koreas have killed eachother’s military personnel since the ceasefire in 1953. Deep down, South Korea and the US are probably hoping for that to happen too.

No one is claming that the US and South Korea would immediately attack the north if China assented, but the fact that the PRC isn’t distancing itself from Pyongyang means there will be no deliberate war. Seoul would be devastated. North Korea would be destroyed. Relations between China and the US would become just as strained as they did in 1950. For war to start deliberately, someone has to benefit from it. This time, no matter who won, everybody would lose.

Futenma flip-flop

 

 

After eight months of public humming and hawing, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has finally made a decision regarding his pre-election promise to move the US airbase at Futenma out of Okinawa and possibly Japan altogether: he will do neither.

Hatoyama had promised the Japanese electorate that he would make up his mind by May, but the fact that the deadline has been met will do little to sway current public opinion of him. Having swept to power last September (the first time in 55 years that his Democratic Party had won), Hatoyama found himself positioned to make real changes to the landscape of Japanese politics. With approval ratings in the mid-70s and a solid mandate to change how Japan interacts with the world, the new PM immediately promised a 'less subservient' relationship with the US and vowed to tear up his predecessor’s agreement to make few changes to the Futenma base arrangements.

The problem is that Futenma is immensely unpopular not just with Okinawans, but with the Japanese people in general. Built smack bang in the middle of a city, it causes traffic jams, noise, huge amounts of pollution and crime. The crime factor became acute when three American marines gang raped a 12 year old girl in 1996, turning public opinion sharply against the continued US presence.

So, once Hatoyama took power, the world expected him to make real changes. With a general power shift towards East Asia occurring, might Japan now want to get closer to China or perhaps pursue a path in between Washington and Beijing? Might Japan recognise Futenma as a cold war relic? Would it change its constitution to allow itself to build a proper military, and allow it to stop relying on an increasingly shaky-looking America for security?

None of that happened. Having considered dozens of plans, gone back and forth to Okinawa, consulted the Pentagon and even been publicly humiliated by the Mayors of two cities which refused to absorb elements of the bases, the PM has finally relented, admitted that the vast majority of the base's functions will continue as they do presently, apologised or his failures, promised to do better in future and asked for understanding. He isn't getting it though, as his approval ratings now stand at about 23%.

So, why does Hatoyama appear intent on committing political suicide? Upper house elections in July will likely see the Democratic Party take a hammering as a result of the Futenma fiasco. Calls are already growing for the PM to resign. His coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, has threatened to withdraw from government altogether over the issue. A popular decision this is not.

No single reason stands out,but in all likelihood Hatoyama decided to keep the base on Okinawa because of a combination of the following factors;

    * Fear of the US. Though undoubtedly a declining force, America is still the most powerful country on Earth, and nowadays expends more diplomatic energy on the Asian Pacific area than anywhere else. A variety of carrots and sticks were probably used by the Americans, but the fact that Hatoyama backed down shows they still exert enough of a grip on Tokyo to keep them in line.

    * Fear of China. Though the idea of China attacking Japan may seem laughable to most people, military leaders have to plan for every eventuality. Japan’s own armed forces are strong, but they wouldn’t last long against the People's Liberation Army. Retaining an American presence would act as a strong deterrent in any hypothetical future conflict.

    * Fear of North Korea. No one would have been more overjoyed had Japan moved the US base out of the country altogether than North Korea, but their sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan 6 weeks ago will have done plenty to convince Tokyo than North Korea is a serious threat.Hatoyama has already cited this as one of the reasons the base must stay, though realistically the decision had probably already been taken at that stage.

Hatoyama must calculate that public anger will die down soon enough to keep him in his job. If it doesn’t, his successor will have taken heed of the lesson and will try to avoid making the same mistakes. Paradoxically, caving in over Futenma could eventually make the Japanese-US relationship more genuinely equal. 

A rising diplomatic superpower

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this week agreed to back a Brazilian-led initiative to resolve the row over his country's nuclear power industry. The plan involves Tehran being supplied with nuclear fuel by Russia and France in exchange for mechanisms which would make it harder for Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

Iran had previously rejected a similar deal, but this time Brazil will act as an honest broker, overseeing the process and acting as a mediator. Ahmadinejad's close relationship with outgoing Brazilian leader Lula undoubtedly helped to build trust, and is yet another sign of Brazil's ascendency on the international stage.

There's nothing strange about that, plenty of countries that were also-rans until recently have suddenly begun to take on huge importance in diplomatic and geopolitical terms. Look at China, Russia or India. All of those countries have, at various times in the past, been incredibly powerful and for historical, cultural, geographic or demographic reasons, have a 'natural' claim on being one of the big players. Their resurgence, is seen as a return to the natural order of things, especially in China's case.

None of that can be said of Brazil. It has no real history of engaging with the world. Culturally it is strong, but nowhere near as strong as India or China, both civilisations rather than nations. It is geographically isolated from the centres of power and while it has the fifth biggest population on Earth, it is still a very poor country with an appalingly unequal distribution of wealth. In all of these areas Brazil is moving forward, and in some cases is already stronger than most countries, but not to a degree that makes it an obvious great power.

Yet it is almost always referred to as part of the rising tide of developing countries which can no longer be ignored. It is a part of the informal BRIC (Brazil Russia India China) group of future economic heavyweights. It is considered by many to the be the planet's best hope for effective action being taken on global warming. It will host the 2014 World Cup and the  2016 Olympic games. During that World Cup, more neutrals will be up for Brazil than any other country. Like chips, the Beatles and Raymond, everybody loves Brazil.

Brazil is unique in this respect. Who else has genuinely close relations with both Venezuela and the US? With Iran and Germany? Russia and Poland? With no historical baggage to sour relations, Brazil has a huge amount of diplomatic credibility and the ambition to use it to its advanatge. Being able to take a large part of the credit for resolving the Iranian issue would be a big feather in Brazil's cap (even if they don't actually do much; the fact that Brazil's mere presence makes Iran more comfortable with the proposed deal says a lot). By refusing to back the idea of sanctions against Tehran, Brazil won browie points with much of the Muslim public without seriously alienating the West. If this proposal comes off, it will be a big step towards Brazil's long-term geopolitical goal: permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

It is generally accepted that the membership of the UNSC is now outdated and unrepresentative. At least one other country will have to be admitted, eventually. All the other potential candidates are problematic. Europe already has three members, so admitting Germany would irritate the rest of the world. China and South Korea would have serious reservations about Japan. Beijing would also likely object to India if it came down to it, though officially they are supportive of the idea. So Brazil is the obvious choice.

It will take years, probably decades for this goal to be achieved, but if and when it is, Brazil will go from an aspiring great power to a very real one, from a diplomatic lightweight to the voice of the developing world and the Southern Hemisphere. Not bad for a nation with none of the traditional strengths needed to become a big player.

Is a bad response better than no response?

The Times is reporting that a torpedo or mine attack was almost certainly the cause of the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan last month. Seoul has thus far gone out of its way to avoid blaming North Korea for the incident, and will find themselves in a very awkward position should unequivocal proof emerge that Pyongyang is responsible. In fact, at the moment we seem to be in a bizarre twilight zone where South Korea is doing everything it can to avoid blaming North Korea for the sinking.  

From Seoul it probably seems that suffering occasional provocations (and doing some provoking of its own every so often) is a fair price to pay for peace. The South knows there is no chance it could be invaded again and it quite happy with its place in the world at present. Though the threat from the North is real, it isn’t existential and after more than 50 years of tense peace on the peninsula Seoul has learned to live with it.

The status quo has been good for South Korea since the end of quasi-fascist rule in the 80s, partly because sabre-rattling from the North has been ignored and nationalistic impulses within the South have been kept in check. Doing nothing is an option which has been taken for a long time now, to the benefit of Seoul.

However, just because something works once, twice, or dozens of times does not mean it will always work. The structure and decision-making processes of the North Korean leadership is opaque, so no one can be sure exactly who might have taken the decision to attack the Cheonan. The reasons for the attack are also unclear but if no retaliation is forthcoming, the lesson Pyongyang will learn is that the South has no stomach for a fight. In the short term that may not have any serious repercussions, but if the North begins to  seriously believe that the South won’t respond to any aggression, then there would be a serious risk of a miscalculation which could lead to war. For all his despotism, Kim Jong ill is fairly rational and very much interested in his own survival as leader, but frankly, any leader who can get away with sinking foreign ships to no consequence could be forgiven for believing they can get away with anything. Deterrence only works if it is credible, and it would be very, very dangerous to let North Korea believe it can torpedo the South’s navy when it feels like it.

On the other hand, retaliating in kind could lead to war too, for obvious reasons. If the Southern response made the North Korea's leadership believes it was under general attack, it really has only one tool with which to hit back: an enormous artillery range trained on Seoul which could inflict absolutely catastrophic damage on the city within the first few hours of a war. This trump card would have to be played very early on as it would be vulnerable to being overrun by American and Southern forces once they cross the border. If the North was to hesitate to react  to a general attack, it would be already have lost the war, so there would be no time to negotiate a climb-down or ceasefire. If war starts, it will start in earnest and won’t end until one side is totally defeated.Such a war would be the biggest war the planet has seen in a long time, not a quick and easy victory like Iraq or Georgia, and would cause hundreds of thousands if not millions of civilian and military deaths, and fundamentally change the security mechanisms of East Asia.

So Seoul’s dithering is understandable. There is no easy decision to make here, and no good decision either. At this very moment, the South Korean government will be hoping that they can be saved from responding by a convenient finding that North Korea wasn’t behind the attack. Without  government interference into the investigation that’s a pretty long shot, and if no such convenient finding is forthcoming, a difficult choice will have to be made.

New poll, same old

A new BBC poll shows that public opinion of the United States is beginning to improve after years of decline during the presidency of George W. Bush. Some of this can be attributed to the ‘Obama Effect’, but other factors are at play here and say more about the media than the changing face of the balance of power across the globe today. Results concerning other countries are unsurprising and reflect not their behaviour, but rather their ability to control their public image.

First though, it’s important to examine some of the methodology used in the annual survey. 30,000 people in 33 countries were asked to rate various countries as having either a positive or negative influence on the world (how they rate their own country isn’t factored in). Different countries are selected every year (though some have been included every year), however this year has thrown up some geographical anomalies.

Every single country in North America was polled (including all six Central American nations), but only Brazil and Chile from South America. Almost every Western European nation’s opinions were included, but from Eastern Europe and the Balkans only Russia was consulted. Not one Middle Eastern or Central Asian nation was polled and only three Sub Saharan African nations made the cut. One needs to consider this when analysing these results.

Germany is the most positively-rated country in the survey. Not hugely surprising, as Berlin rarely offends anyone, is generous with aid and an incident in Afghanistan last year where its forces called in an air strike that killed around 100 civilians went largely unreported. It’s one of the great ironies of geopolitics that Germany has finally managed to dominate Europe and simultaneously become perhaps more popular than it ever has been.

Brazil is rated positively by 41% of respondents and negatively by 23%. One struggles to imagine what people imagine Brazil’s negative effects on the world to be, perhaps the inability of the state to fully protect the Amazon is a factor, but more likely is the fact that as Brazil becomes a bigger player on the world stage, it simply attracts more attention and thus more criticism.

This effect could also explain why positive views of China have dropped from 49% in 2005 to 34% today. Western media relentlessly portrays China in a negative light, but China still rates reasonably well. Unsurprisingly, African countries which have been large recipients of Chinese investment hold overwhelmingly positive (c. 70%) view of the People’s Republic. Oddly, no country has a poor a view of China as Italy does. Maybe Italians find Chinese politicians’ dull manner a poor contrast to their own Prime Minister’s behaviour.

Russia ranks poorly, as it has done since these polls were first taken.  Especially loathed in America, Mexico, the EU, South Korea and Japan, Moscow can at least be consoled by the fact that 55% of Chinese deem their giant northern neighbour to be a force for good. In the long run, this may be the most important statistic for Moscow. While Russia is viewed badly by the German and French publics, it has enough economic clout to ensure those countries’ governments seek warm relations with the Bear.

Predictably, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran are more-or-less universally despised. That won’t change in the foreseeable future and to be fair, none of those countries are trying to be loved. That western, democratic Israel is lumped in with a collapsing state, a dictatorship and a theocracy says a lot. Americans only just about see Israel positively overall, but this won’t worry the Israeli government as it knows its patron will always turn a blind eye to its treatment of Palestinians.

Which makes one wonder why so many people have a positive view of America.  Though Russia, Mexico, Germany, Turkey, China and Pakistan retain negative views of the US, its image has improved quite a bit in the last three years. Overall, 34% of respondents consider the US to have a negative influence on the world. 40% view America in a positive light, up from 27% in 2007. Could that be because the US has finally pulled out of Iraq as it promised to do? Maybe because Guantanamo Bay has been shut down? Perhaps the fact that civilians are no longer being killed in Afghanistan has something to do with it? Dramatic action on climate change? Proper dialogue with Iran instead of threats?

No, more than likely this can be explained by how little attention most people actually pay to international politics. Whatever your opinion on the US is, nothing has substantially changed about its foreign policies in the last three years apart from the manner in which the White House conducts itself. Despite having more control over media than any other country on Earth, America is still not a particularly popular country, but as long as almost no one is paying any attention, that doesn’t really matter.

Counter-counter revolution in Kyrgyzstan

 

Most people outside Central Asia have no idea how to pronounce the name 'Kyrgyzstan', couldn't find it on a map and know nothing of its history, so it may seem somewhat surprising that its internal politics provided the biggest news story of last week.

One might be even more surprised to discover that the three biggest players in world politics, the US, China and Russia expend considerable diplomatic energy trying to keep the former SSR within their spheres of influence, or at least out of eachother's.  On the face of it, Kyrgyzstan doesn't seem very important in the greater scheme of things. It has virtually no oil or gas, it's economy is a basket case and it's military is pitiful, composed almost entirely of decrepit Soviet weapony.

As with all geopolitical topics though, Kyrgyzstan's geography must be considered. It is situated in an extraordinarily stratregically important location.
To the East is China's troublesome Xinjiang province. Like Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan is mostly Muslim, mostly Turkic and mostly poor. China has a big interest in ensuring that it's tiny neighbour doesn't become a base for seperatists or Islamicists. Beijing uses soft power, mostly trade, to maintain good terms with Bishkek. In future, maybe it can become a satellite state. For now, stability is the goal.

The US also has quite a big strategic interest in Kyrgyzstan. Manas Air Base, in the north of the country, is used to transport a huge amount of American soldiers to Afghanistan. in 2009, when Russia bribed the previous Kyrgyz government to close the base, Washington quickly agreed to triple the amount of rent it paid to keep the base open. Given how unreliable overland supply routes to Afghanistan are, America's reaction was a measure of just how important Manas is.

But going back on the deal with the Kremlin was a huge strategic error by the now-deposed government. The 'aid package' Russia gave was never explicitly tied to the eviction of the USAF, but both were announced on the same day in a manner that left it clear to everyone in no doubt that Moscow have been the driving force between the closure. Once the former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev had a change of heart and allowed the US to continue use of the base, things turned sour. How he could not have foreseen last week's event is anyone's guess, but soon enough Russian energy supplies became a lot more expensive, Russian-owned media turned hostile to the government, and the Kremlin recognised the new government almost before it had taken power.

Russia has numerous controls mechanisms over Bishkek, like the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Community customs union. Membership of all these organisations is genuinely voluntary, and beneficial for all states concerned. But Moscow still considers itself to have a sphere of influence in Central Asia, and has no intention of allowing either China or America chip away at it, however slowly. So from the Kremlin's point of view, something had to be done.

Here's what will happen. The new Kyrgyz government, led by Roza Otunbayeva will not evict the US. However, it will make it clear that the decision is not entirely theirs to make, and that were Russia to lean heavily on them, they could be left with no choice. Nikita Khruschev once said Berlin was '...the testicles of the west. When I want them to scream, I just squeeze Berlin'. On a much smaller scale, that is the principle behind Russia's interest in Kyrgyzstan. Now wouldn't be a good time to damage relations with Washingon, but it's nice to know it can be done if needs be.

There is also another benefit for Putin and Medvedev. Like almost all of Russia's 'near abroad', Kyrgyzstan likes to try and balance Russian influence by maintaing decent relations with other great powers. However, Moscow appears to be tiring of what it sees as its disloyal neighbours playing this game. Belarus aggravates The Kremlin by using the EU as leverage against Moscow, but Alexander Lukashenko will take a clear message from the events of the last week: You can only push it so far. If we can make this happen in Bishkek, we can do the same in Minsk. Like all the big players in world politics, Russia has bullying tendencies and likes to make examples. What better example than a President fleeing for his life thorugh the mountains of Central Asia?

Good, but not great

After months of delay, the US and Russia have finally signed a new START treaty limiting both sides to 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons. In the mid-1980s, the two superpowers had roughly 60,000 warheads pointed at each other, so it would seem that this treaty is a real and tangible boost to the cause of nuclear disarmament. In reality, START changes little.
 

Not the likelihood or destructive power of a hypothetical war between Russia and America anyway, but things have changed for Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. Both Presidents have benefited politically from this treaty in strikingly similar ways.
 

Assuming Medvedev can get ratification from the Duma, START will be the first major policy he has realised independently from Vladimir Putin, showing that he may not be as much of a puppet as had previously been suspected. The Russian security establishment, or Siloviki, will not necessarily be happy with this treaty. The exact wording has yet to be finalised, but it looks likely that no link between START and American missile bases in Eastern Europe will be explicitly mentioned. In recent months, every time Medvedev said anything positive about how negotiations were going, Putin made a point of publicly stating that the possibility of a missile shield based in Romania and Bulgaria would be a big obstacle, and more recently Boris Gryzlov, a close ally of Putin and speaker of the Duma said that ratification would be dependent on such a link being made.
 

Up against such opposition, Medvedev would be looking at a major victory if he can sign this treaty into law in Prague this April. If he is considering running against Putin for the Presidency in 2012, then this is the opening shot of that competition. The treaty presents almost identical benefits and problems to Obama.
The ‘reset’ of relations with Russia had, up until now, been a bit of a joke. Nothing really happened and like practically every other major platform of Obama’s presidency until this month, there was no actual substance behind the oratory and charisma. Obama isn’t stupid though, and he realised that without some policy victories to point to, the Democrats would be absolutely hammered in November’s elections. Now he can add this to the Healthcare Reform Bill on his list of changes.
 

Undoubtedly, relations between Russia and the US are far better now than the Bush era. The two nations still have fundamentally opposed interests, and Moscow isn’t going to stop its drive to thwart the US at almost every turn because of a piece of paper, but at least some common ground has been found. Obama can legitimately say his negotiations have paid off. Ratification in the Senate isn’t a certainty either, but he will have an easier time of it than Medvedev. Most people would rather argue with Palin than Putin.
 

The timing is great too; now the US can keep a somewhat straight face when it says Iran shouldn’t build nuclear weapons at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in a fortnight. Few people familiar with US or Russian foreign policy will say they have the moral high ground while dealing with anyone, but this does give Obama some tenuous moral authority to lecture Iran, in the eyes of some people at least.
There are also fringe benefits for both sides. Missile batteries aren’t cheap to run (more of an issue for the Kremlin than the White House), so more money can be diverted into practical military applications like counter-terrorism units, modernisation of conventional forces, etc.
 

In reality though, 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads is more than enough to create the nightmarish nuclear holocaust that haunted the world in the early 1980s. Even with their reduced arsenals, both sides retain the ability to absolutely and utterly destroy each other and every other state on Earth several times over. Such a scenario is extremely unlikely, but in all likelihood it will never go away completely. The value in this treaty is political and diplomatic, not military; it matters little whether a country gets hit by 1,000 or 40,000 nuclear warheads.

 

Israel and the US: hand in hand or chained together?

The announcement of further Israeli colonisation of East Jerusalem should come as a shock to no one, but its timing must have felt like a slap in the face to Joe Biden. The measured and calculated public ‘row’ which followed, which was called the worst crisis between the US and Israel in 35 years only illustrates the point that the US won’t abandon Israel, come what may.

Racist crackpots like to imagine that Jews control the media, but if that was true, surely they would have had an easier time of it these last few weeks. There has been almost universal condemnation of their settlement extensions and bombing of Gaza, and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon made a point of condemning the blockade of Palestine during his visit there. But it’s beginning to look like Israel no longer cares what the rest of the world thinks.

From their point of view, why should they? The Israeli elite knows that it is seen as the bad guy across the world, and barring an unprecedented attack on Israel, that’s not going to change. Why should they exert effort fighting a losing battle for public opinion? It really doesn’t affect life for the average Israeli citizen if people in Europe, China or Brazil perceive them as the aggressors. All that matters is security. And Israel’s is guaranteed.

Contrary to popular perception, Israel doesn’t rely on the US for security. Its armed forces are by far the strongest in the region, and while they do primarily use American equipment, they also buy from Europe and are developing an indigenous arms industry. Even if the Israeli Defence Forces were overwhelmed and Arab armies approached their borders, Israel could threaten to obliterate Damascus, Riyadh and Beirut with just a few of the 200-odd nuclear weapons they have. Tehran gaining a handful of nukes would make no difference to that equation; Iran would be committing national suicide if it used WMDs on Israel.

But Israel does rely on the US to keep the UN Security Council from passing resolutions against it. The relationship is essentially a diplomatic one for Israel, conducted through their lobby groups in Washington (Like any nation with a large diaspora, Israeli lobby groups are disproportionately powerful. Ireland and Armenia punch above their weight in a similar manner).

The lobby groups don’t have to do much lobbying though, as the US wouldn’t dream of dropping Israel or even becoming an honest broker in the Middle East.  The embarrassment America suffers for its support is more than offset by the fact that Israel is the best proxy Washington can buy. Direct intervention in the Middle East is not going to be a realistic option for the US for some time. In the meantime, it can rely on Israel to do its bidding, be that bombing Iran or assassinating Hamas members, because their objectives broadly coincide.
American policy has been so oriented towards Israel for so long that it could no longer change direction even if it wanted to, and it doesn’t want to. Israel knows The White House doesn’t really care how it acts in the occupied territories, and that no existential threat towards the Jewish State actually exists. Both sides are locked together, and that suits them perfectly. Nothing to see here.

 

Options for Turkey

More than any other country today, Turkey has options. It's in a situation many countries would envy, having myriad choices with which to shape its own future and decide how it identifies itself. If it can remain relatively stable, it has a bright future ahead.

So what exactly are those options? Well, a few of them would have seemed unthinkable even a few years ago. Quiet, strategic diplomacy has opened some doors; storming out of meetings has opened others.

The meeting in question was the World Economic Forum in Davos last year. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won praise in the Muslim world after angrily leaving a public session of the summit following a row with Israeli President Shimon Peres about the ongoing attack on the Gaza Strip. This was the first indication that there might be some serious problems in the previously cosy relationship between the two countries. Relations have since deteriorated further, and it appears that this may be in part an effort on the part of Ankara to position itself as a champion of the Muslim world. Erdoğan’s party, the AKP, is relatively religious by Turkish standards, and may have decided to align itself with its neighbours to the south, a strategy sometimes called Neo-Ottomanism (more out of laziness than any relevance to history).

This would of course damage relations with the US, but they have peaked anyway. Several factors have conspired to damage relations between Washington and Ankara recently. In 2003, the Turks refused to allow the US to invade Iraq from its territory. Understandable, considering the last thing Turkey wanted was an independent or autonomous Kurdistan on its doorstep (to all intents and purposes Iraqi Kurdistan is independent now), but subsequent remarks by Donald Rumsfeld which blamed Turkey for the strength of the resistance made Ankara question the value of the alliance. Then two weeks ago the US took a big step towards recognising the Armenian genocide, infuriating Ankara and straining the alliance even further. Obama will try to block full recognition, but the fact that the resolution got this far makes the Turks take a very dim view of the Americans. There are no longer any real military threats to the Turks, so while the US will remain a partner, its importance will diminish in future.

Not as much as it would if Turkey became a member of the EU. That’s a big ‘if’ though, and it looks less likely all the time. There are many reasons for the EU to keep Turkey out, few to let them in. Turkey would be initially the second biggest and eventually the biggest nation in Europe. Why would Germany, France and the UK dilute their own power by letting another heavyweight in? Also, while the EU officially supports total civilian control of the Turkish military, in reality they know that if that actually happened, Turkey could become an Islamicised state, not a popular concept in Brussels. A more likely outcome to the saga is Turkey eventually being given some sort of associate membership. Deep down they must know they aren’t going to be admitted, but withdrawing their application now would be counterproductive, so they must maintain the facade of chasing full membership.

So while there has been deterioration towards the west, none of it is irreversible or catastrophic. Israel needs to keep at least one Muslim country onside, so it won’t sever ties. As the US needs the use of bases in Turkey, particularly the airbase at Incirlik, Obama will do everything he can to avoid offending his ally. The EU doesn’t want its neighbour as a member, but doesn’t want to close the door completely, so it will find a compromise.

Things look brighter to the east. The border with Armenia was recently reopened with Russia’s blessing. Motivating this is a desire to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey sides with Azerbaijan, but knows realistically that as long as Armenia is backed by Russia, only a diplomatic solution is an option, and that won’t happen while Ankara is completely at odds with Yerevan. If the situation could be resolved, Turkey would have a stable if not friendly neighbour on its border, a grateful and oil-rich ally in Azerbaijan.

Russia would also be pleased. And that’s no bad thing, considering how much gas comes from Siberia to Anatolia. Moscow is Ankara’s biggest trading partner, and a possible fall-back should relations with the US ever take a spectacular dive. If Turkey ever did want to align itself with the Bear, it could consider recognising Abkhazia. Turkey is host to a large Abkhaz diaspora, and could conceivably challenge Russia as the tiny Republic’s benefactor down the line. Moscow and Ankara probably have too many areas of competition to ever become true allies, but the potential for a mutually beneficial arrangement is there, should Turkey decide to pursue it.

There are also indications that Iran could be a possible target for Turkish diplomacy. President of Turkey Abdullah Gül was quick to recognise Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the legitimate winner of June’s elections. While there is no drive to emulate the Iranian Theocratic system in Turkey, there is no desire to have the Kurds in Iran achieve autonomy as they did in Iraq either, so for that reason Turkey would not welcome the collapse of the Iranian state. There are extensive trading links between the two nations, and despite some rivalry for the affections of Syria, if a regional arms race can be avoided there would be potential for the two countries to work together.

But the most profitable (both literally and metaphorically) area where Turkey could expand its influence is also the unlikeliest. Far-fetched though it might sound, there would be some real and tangible benefits if Turkey could normalise relations with the Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Kurdistan is a de facto nation now. It’s not going away, but as long as it isn’t providing any real support to independence for Kurds in Turkey, it’s no threat. It does, however, have huge oil reserves and the most likely market for that oil is Europe. One look at a map tells that for this to come to fruition, Turkey would have to agree to be a transit hub for this oil. That can be a lucrative business, and also one which gives political influence. If Turkey could help develop the economy of a Kurdish state and profit from it, it would have to its south a relatively stable nation who it could strangle economically if it so choose. For this to happen there would have to be a fundamental shift in Turkey’s view of the Kurds, but pragmatism almost always trumps ideology, and if the oil transport revenues looked big enough, it would become plausible.

So the ball is in Turkey’s court in many respects. The spectre of army coups and the destruction of the secular basis of the nation are a reality, but the recent arrest on suspicion of coup-mongering of dozens of army officers shows the government finally feels confident enough to take on the armed forces. If it can maintain internal stability, Turkey has the freedom to decide its own future, a privilege few nations enjoy. 

The Future of Ukraine

As Yulia Tymoshenko lost a vote of no confidence last week, the last vestiges of the Orange Revolution left the Supreme Rada with her. Viktor Yanukovych is now left with the difficult task of replacing her, but on some level he must feel relieved that he is now firmly in charge. The worst may be yet to come.

Ukraine is in a location that ensures it will always be of interest to bigger powers than itself. Sandwiched between a giant which sees the country as almost part of itself (hence the nickname ‘Little Russia’) and an EU which is obliged to leave the door open to all European countries, Ukraine is also a stakeholder in the Black Sea and close and involved enough in the Caucasus to send weapons to there, as it did during the 2008 war between Saakashvilli and Putin.

For a little while more, it will also serve as a transit route for Siberian gas on its way to heat homes and power businesses in Europe. This has guaranteed that Moscow will have an economic as well as strategic interest in Ukraine, but will soon change. The South Stream gas pipeline, due online in 2015, will bypass Ukraine and give Russia a freer hand in dealing with Kiev.

This wouldn’t restrict Ukraine so much if it had somewhere else to turn, but it doesn’t.  Its economy shrank by 15% last year, which won’t exactly do much for its prospects of joining the EU. Brussels won’t ever shut the door completely, but membership, which seemed an imminent possibility when Viktor Yuschenko became President in 2005, now looks a long way off. Germany hates having to bail Greece out; it’s not going to accept a potentially worse case into the Union any time soon. A few loans will likely be forthcoming from Europe, but not in the volumes that would be required to steady the ship. Nor is the cavalry coming over the hill. The majority of country is dead against joining NATO, so there is no prospect of economic benefits as a result of becoming a US ally.

So while he won’t make the country a Russian vassal, Yanukovych will need a lot of help from Moscow. This won’t be too bitter of a pill to swallow for him; his support base is overwhelmingly in the Russian-speaking areas in the east of the country, centred on Donetsk. He speaks far better Russian than Ukrainian. But he is no agent of the Kremlin, so will seek good terms for his country.

One mechanism for achieving this could be the Customs Union of which Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members. Realistically, membership would cede economic control to the Kremlin to a degree, but it would also make gas cheaper, an essential factor in the recovery of heavy industry in the east of the country. Russia would be only too delighted to welcome its little brother into this club. And Ukraine has other hands to play. It could get some decent loans or subsidies if the lease on the Russian naval base in Crimea was extended. Then there is Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It cost Russia $50m to get the Pacific micronation of Nauru to recognise them, and while that payoff wouldn’t be scaled to size (if it was, Ukraine could expect to receive $1,437,209,000,000), Kiev would still reap lucrative rewards if they followed suit. The most that could be offered to Russia would be accession to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, but Yanukovych will avoid this if at all possible, because it would destroy any grudging acceptance he has in the west of the country.

So here’s what will happen. Yanukovych will make a few gestures, like giving the Russian language official status, retracting Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera’s Hero of Ukraine award and dropping any suggestion of ever joining NATO. Medvedev and Putin will reciprocate with some loans and investment, and small gestures will go on like this for a while. But eventually, Moscow will demand something more concrete, and in the absence of a miraculous economic recovery, Kiev will be over a barrel and obliged to provide.

Doublespeak Season Has Started Early This Year

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said recently that European ‘pacifism’ is a danger to global peace, and part of a trend which constitutes a large political and cultural problem. His remarks came after the Dutch government collapsed following a row between coalition partners about deployments to Afghanistan, resulting in the total withdrawal of Dutch forces (2,000 soldiers) from the NATO mission.

Gates’ statement can ostensibly be seen as a warning to other European countries not to follow suit, but in reality it reflects a general feeling in Washington that Europe is not pulling its weight. The feeling in Brussels is that Europe will decide for itself how much weight it should pull, and in what direction.

During the cold war, the US was happy for Western Europe to remain militarily weak so the White House could dictate policy toward the USSR. Reasoning that as long as America footed the bill for deterring a real or imagined Soviet threat, it could ensure that no NATO member could have an independent policy toward the Soviet Union. This was a largely successful strategy, keeping both sides happy until the end of the cold war.

But as EU integration has accelerated, Western Europe has become inclined to take an independent, if not always divergent, attitude to foreign policy. Differing approaches on Iraq, Russia and Turkey have made it apparent that European and American interests will not always coincide. In theory this is acceptable to the US, but in practice Washington can barely hide its frustration at Western European lack of enthusiasm for fighting an unwinnable war against the Taliban, taking a belligerent line with Moscow, keeping Turkey’s EU application on the long finger and so on.

American power is much weakened since its heyday in the 90s, and Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed how limited even huge military power is. With its economy in tatters, the US would like the wealthy states it imagines itself to have saved during World Wars one and two and the cold war to begin to pull their weight by increasing military commitment to the various and ceaseless conflicts America finds itself embroiled in. Bush’s plan for the US to go it alone failed spectacularly, and Washington now realises that ‘New Europe’ is of little use as an ally.

What Gates and co fail to understand is that Europe has had a totally different experience of war than the US, and does not share the same mindset as their American partners. Even militaristic Europeans know that there is no threat to the EU from Russia or Iran and no appetite among the European public for power projection that would involve deploying large amounts of EU soldiers abroad. There is no messianic desire or ability to ‘spread democracy’ or selectively depose authoritarian governments on this side of the Atlantic.

As the EU moves towards becoming a serious power in its own right, of course it will become more assertive internationally, but that doesn’t mean it need become more aggressive. Europe is secured against external attack as it is, and already spends more on its military than Russia and China combined. If Europe was to increase its spending as Gates has requested, it would have a corresponding increase in influence on the world stage. And that would be unacceptable to the US, as the lead up to the Iraq war showed. America wants allies like Poland and Georgia, ones that will play along with its adventures without asking too many questions or raising too many objections. If the EU ever does end up having a unified military, it won’t be used to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the Pentagon.

Mind-boggling timing of Taiwan weapons sales makes you wonder…

The Dalai Lama’s visit to the White House came less than two weeks after the US decided to OK a huge arms deal with Taiwan. It also came a few weeks before the US does its best to convince China that it should back heavy sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. Either American priorities aren’t what they appear to be, or all is not as it seems…

Iran’s revelation in September 09 that it is building a nuclear reactor in Qom seemed to have changed Medvedev’s, if not Putin’s mind on some form of sanctions. Iran was forced to make the admission because if they didn’t, the west was going to ‘out’ them anyway. Western leaders expressed mock horror (their intelligence agencies had probably known about it for a long time, projects of this size aren’t easy to hide), Israel was furious and even Russia began to dither from its support for Iran. Only China now stood in the way.

But the PRC would take some convincing. It buys a lot of gas and oil from Iran, and is reluctant to endanger its energy supplies, none of which are particularly secure (except its own coal production) or reliable. The two ancient nations have the potential to be of huge benefit to each other during China's rise.

So why would the US agree to host the Dalai Lama at this sensitive time? Well, there are several reasons. This trip was originally scheduled for last October, but was postponed by Obama so as not to sour a trip to Beijing. But he can defer so many times before it becomes damaging for him at home. The right-wing lunatic fringe led by Sarah Palin, Rush Limbaugh and Glen Beck have already accused Obama of letting the US get pushed around on the international scene, and a second postponement would appear to confirm the charge that he can’t stand up to Beijing. Hu's opinion is important, but not as many Americans listen to Hu as listen to Glen Beck.

Another factor is how the Tibetan ‘spiritual leader’ is perceived in the western world. Years of support for an independent or autonomous Tibet by celebrities may be well-intentioned, but ignores what that Tibet would look like. Despite the fact that the Dalai Lama would be an unelected quasi-theocratic leader, many in Europe and North America imagine him to be an Asian Nelson Mandela type figure, albeit one who occasionally shills iPods. Obama would take a lot of flack if he appeared to be taking the Chinese Communist Party’s side over a cuddly, smiling monk because of economic concerns.

So it’s not too hard to see why the White House may have decided that they can’t and shouldn’t postpone this visit again. The weapons sales to Taiwan though, are baffling.

Since 1979, the US has been legally obligated to sell Taiwan weapons with which to defend itself from any attempt to reintegrate it into the People’s Republic. This leaves the island in a pretty secure position, despite the imbalance of forces between itself and the mainland. The terrain of the island and the weakness of the People’s Liberation Navy mean China would have its work cut out invading. It is generally assumed that if China did attempt such an adventure, the US would intervene anyway (I question whether they would, given what that could escalate in to). As long as Taiwan doesn’t declare independence, the PRC seems resigned to the situation. Every so often the US upgrades the island’s military capability, stressing that any weapons sold are of a defensive nature (they usually are), China makes a token protest, and back to square one.

These days though, the balance of power has shifted.Beijing won’t accept being ignored, and can retaliate to American provocations. When the deal was announced, Chinese state news agency Xinhua published a condemnation, saying the sale 'is a wrong decision’, ‘Frankly speaking, US arms sales to Taiwan have become a chronic disease that has been disturbing China-US ties for a long period of time’ and (the deal) ‘exposes the US usage of double standards and hypocrisy on major issues related to China's core interests’. If the State Department had expected the usual weak protest, they must have been sorely disappointed.

The reasons for the timing of the sale can only be guessed at. One possibility is that the US totally underestimated China’s reaction, but this is unlikely given how assertive the PRC has become in the last few years. Maybe Washington hoped, as they often seem to, that other countries will just see things as they do, and refuse to connect Iran and Taiwan out of some sense of good sportsmanship. Maybe the Obama administration’s diplomacy is as inept as the Bush administration’s was.

But there is another possibility. The Iranian state is shakier than it has been since the revolution, but the opposition still isn’t strong enough to topple the President, never mind the Supreme Leader. The US would like to apply pressure, but knows from experience that sanctions don’t topple leaders with large public support (as Khamenei has) and a loyal and dedicated security force. After Iraq, the last thing the US is going to do is attack Iran without a proper causus belli, so while the US publicly pushes for harsh sanctions on the Islamic Republic, it’s not beyond the bounds of possibility that it would welcome an Israeli attack on Iran which might convince elements in the country that overthrowing a weakened Revolutionary Guard and state could be easier than rebuilding nuclear infrastructure. It would be unlikely to work, but no more unlikely than sanctions.

Why won’t Russia deliver the S-300s?

RIA Novosti recently reported that Russia is addressing technical issues which have long delayed the delivery of five S-300 Anti-Aircraft batteries to Iran. No doubt Tehran will be encouraged by this, but five years after the contract for the potent AA system was signed, they must be beginning to wonder if the weapons are ever actually going to arrive.

The deal was agreed in 2005, at the height of Bush’s anti-Iranian rhetoric, when an attack on the Islamic Republic seemed like an imminent possibility, and made perfect sense for both sides at the time. Putin was beginning to lose patience with Bush, and didn't want to see another US puppet established in the Gulf. Iran’s armed forces had nothing that could stand up to an American or Israeli strike, and needed some form of deterrent. Enter the S-300, the Russian equivalent of Patriot missiles.

But the AA systems never materialised. Moscow realised that the threat of delivering to Iran could be used as leverage against the US. Putin decided that this card would be best kept up his sleeve, only to be played when an ace was needed.

Then Obama got elected. For the first few months of his presidency, there was genuine optimism that US-Russia relations could improve, so the Kremlin reasoned that irritating Iran was a risk worth taking if the pay off was a workable, if not friendly, relationship with the US. Gradually though, the ‘reset’ petered out, and although some progress was made on START 2 talks, Russia has only ever expressed vague support for weak sanctions on Tehran, and knows full well China will block even that. There was no serious rapprochement. Still, why hadn’t the AA systems arrived in Iran?

Russia basically wants to have its cake and eat it. Its position has dramatically improved in the last ten years, but it still needs diplomatic leverage and sees the US as its principal adversary. While the US is making noises about deploying a new missile shield in the Balkans, Russia will hold on to its ability to respond in kind. While America still has a presence in central Asia, Russia will want to keep an ally in the Gulf. Russia’s foreign policy is more anti-American than any other major player, including China. Providing the US’ biggest enemy in the region with the means to defend itself is completely in line with Putin’s drive to squeeze the US out of central Asia. On the other hand, if it can secure an implicit assurance from Washington that NATO won’t be expanding any time soon, or work with the Americans to limit Chinese power, it won’t aggravate its adversary needlessly. If Dmitry Medvedev has more power than most people think, this may be a serious possibility.

But it can’t keep all sides dangling for ever. Some recent events indicate it may have decided to drop Iran and try and cultivate a serious relationship with Saudi Arabia. Russia has no ideological qualms about arming one theocracy, so it would be quite comfortable switching to another. However, that may be just an insurance policy, or a means to make Iran more pliable. There are serious dangers involved in reneging on the S-300 sales to Tehran.

First, it would seriously harm Moscow’s reputation as an arms supplier, and the timing of this would be disastrous, coming as it does just as Rosoboronexport’s hardware is finding new markets. Venezuela, Vietnam and other countries will think twice about placing orders which may not be filled. Sales of the new 5th generation PAK FA fighter, Russia’s most prestigious military project in years, would likely suffer.

Secondly, Iran could increase the volume of gas it sells, depressing prices and harming Russia’s economy. There would be no good time for this to happen, but now would be a particularly bad one, with Russia taking a long time to emerge from recession and the Kremlin still trying to find funds to modernise Russian infrastructure and the military.

For almost seven years now, we have heard an Israeli or American air strike on Iran will happen any day. But this situation cannot go on indefinitely; Israel must soon decide whether it can live with a nuclear, if not a nuclear-armed Iran. Russia must decide where to place its bets. If S-300s played the major role in successfully repelling an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, Russian-American relations would plummet. If, on the other hand, Russia allows Iran to be bombed, its can forget about its relationship with Tehran. It’s not as if Iran doesn’t have anywhere else to turn; it has a potentially far more powerful patron to the east whose appetite for energy and investment potential could be the long-term solution to Tehran’s economic problems.

My guess is that Iran will be allowed to dangle for a while yet, but unless the US can offer some serious compensation for leaving Iran open to attack, the S-300s will find their way across the Caspian Sea sooner or later. It's hard to imagine what that compensation could be; Georgia and Ukraine aren't going to be joining NATO for the foreseeable future no matter what happens, the WTO will eventually admit Russia in even if the US doesn't particularly like it, and the days when the White House could hint at a 'colour revolution' being funded in the Russian Federation are long gone. For a country supposedly in terminal decline, Russia has a lot of sway over the most important region in the world.