31 May 2010

China still calls the shots in Korea



As expected, China has refused to blame North Korea for the sinking of the warship Cheonan at a summit with the Japanese and South Korean leaders. Though China and North Korea both abandoned Marxism long ago, their ties still run deep enough for Beijing to keep an open mind on the incident.

However, as with almost every geopolitical situation these days, pragmatism  and not ideology is the motivation. At present, China benefits from its quasi-alliance with the DPRK in several ways and is not willing to destroy it to no benefit. War, which would destroy North Korea, would be catastrophic for several reasons.

First and foremost, China wants to avoid having an American-allied, unified Korea on its border. If that came to pass, China’s already questionable ability to respond to a Taiwanese declaration of independence would disappear altogether. Deterring the US navy from intervening in Taiwan would be one thing, dealing with an American force which had a land border with China another. The bad publicity that China inc. accrues as a result of its links with Pyongyang is worth keeping the US away from the border. A scenario where China and the Americans are fighting in Korea won’t happen in the foreseeable future but Beijing’s entire strategy revolves around long-term planningd and to ignore the value of having an ally in such a situation would be remiss in the extreme.

Secondly, the PRC props North Korea up because it simply couldn’t afford to let it collapse. If it did, China would have to cope with hundreds of thousands, if not million of refugees. Also, the impact of sudden reunification on the South Korean economy would be devastating and would in turn seriously damage China’s trade with Seoul. The regional economy would be destabilised and would take years to recover. Politburo members planning China’s rise to supremacy assume and desire no more big economic shocks and will avoid them happening on their doorstep at all costs.

Thirdly, North Korea gives the PRC leverage over the west and the Americans in particular. Selling more arms to Taiwan? Well, forget about us supporting anti-DPRK Security Council resolutions. Criticising our monetary policies? Don’t be surprised if a shipment of new tanks finds its way to the Korean People’s Army. All the big players use small countries as leverage against each other, and Pyongyang is more than happy to play the part. There is of course a risk that the tail could wag the dog, but as long as North Korea depends on China for fuel, food and money, it won’t overstep any lines China may draw in the sand.

The nature of the situation on the peninsula means there is always a risk of a war starting accidentally. One of the regular small-scale firefights on the DMZ could get out of hand. A new naval clash could escalate before either country’s government has a chance to calm the situation down. However, those dangers have existed since 1953, and all concerned parties have learned to live with it. The risks can be minimised but never eliminated completely. As long as the two countries are divided, war is always a possibility.

But it would take an accident or miscalculation to start a new war. No one, not even Kim or the US actually wants the situation to turn hot. Russia and China have both called for further investigations into the Cheonan incident, which means they are still hoping to delay any punishment the rest of the world may want to visit on DPRK. Moscow and Beijing may believe that if they can delay punitive action for long enough, tempers will cool and the incident can be largely consigned to the history books, along with the hundreds of other occasions when the two Koreas have killed eachother’s military personnel since the ceasefire in 1953. Deep down, South Korea and the US are probably hoping for that to happen too.

No one is claming that the US and South Korea would immediately attack the north if China assented, but the fact that the PRC isn’t distancing itself from Pyongyang means there will be no deliberate war. Seoul would be devastated. North Korea would be destroyed. Relations between China and the US would become just as strained as they did in 1950. For war to start deliberately, someone has to benefit from it. This time, no matter who won, everybody would lose.

24 May 2010

Futenma flip-flop

 
 
After eight months of public humming and hawing, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has finally made a decision regarding his pre-election promise to move the US airbase at Futenma out of Okinawa and possibly Japan altogether: he will do neither.

Hatoyama had promised the Japanese electorate that he would make up his mind by May, but the fact that the deadline has been met will do little to sway current public opinion of him. Having swept to power last September (the first time in 55 years that his Democratic Party had won), Hatoyama found himself positioned to make real changes to the landscape of Japanese politics. With approval ratings in the mid-70s and a solid mandate to change how Japan interacts with the world, the new PM immediately promised a 'less subservient' relationship with the US and vowed to tear up his predecessor’s agreement to make few changes to the Futenma base arrangements.

The problem is that Futenma is immensely unpopular not just with Okinawans, but with the Japanese people in general. Built smack bang in the middle of a city, it causes traffic jams, noise, huge amounts of pollution and crime. The crime factor became acute when three American marines gang raped a 12 year old girl in 1996, turning public opinion sharply against the continued US presence.

So, once Hatoyama took power, the world expected him to make real changes. With a general power shift towards East Asia occurring, might Japan now want to get closer to China or perhaps pursue a path in between Washington and Beijing? Might Japan recognise Futenma as a cold war relic? Would it change its constitution to allow itself to build a proper military, and allow it to stop relying on an increasingly shaky-looking America for security?

None of that happened. Having considered dozens of plans, gone back and forth to Okinawa, consulted the Pentagon and even been publicly humiliated by the Mayors of two cities which refused to absorb elements of the bases, the PM has finally relented, admitted that the vast majority of the base's functions will continue as they do presently, apologised or his failures, promised to do better in future and asked for understanding. He isn't getting it though, as his approval ratings now stand at about 23%.

So, why does Hatoyama appear intent on committing political suicide? Upper house elections in July will likely see the Democratic Party take a hammering as a result of the Futenma fiasco. Calls are already growing for the PM to resign. His coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, has threatened to withdraw from government altogether over the issue. A popular decision this is not.

No single reason stands out,but in all likelihood Hatoyama decided to keep the base on Okinawa because of a combination of the following factors;

    * Fear of the US. Though undoubtedly a declining force, America is still the most powerful country on Earth, and nowadays expends more diplomatic energy on the Asian Pacific area than anywhere else. A variety of carrots and sticks were probably used by the Americans, but the fact that Hatoyama backed down shows they still exert enough of a grip on Tokyo to keep them in line.

    * Fear of China. Though the idea of China attacking Japan may seem laughable to most people, military leaders have to plan for every eventuality. Japan’s own armed forces are strong, but they wouldn’t last long against the People's Liberation Army. Retaining an American presence would act as a strong deterrent in any hypothetical future conflict.

    * Fear of North Korea. No one would have been more overjoyed had Japan moved the US base out of the country altogether than North Korea, but their sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan 6 weeks ago will have done plenty to convince Tokyo than North Korea is a serious threat.Hatoyama has already cited this as one of the reasons the base must stay, though realistically the decision had probably already been taken at that stage.

Hatoyama must calculate that public anger will die down soon enough to keep him in his job. If it doesn’t, his successor will have taken heed of the lesson and will try to avoid making the same mistakes. Paradoxically, caving in over Futenma could eventually make the Japanese-US relationship more genuinely equal. 

09 May 2010

A rising diplomatic superpower

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this week agreed to back a Brazilian-led initiative to resolve the row over his country's nuclear power industry. The plan involves Tehran being supplied with nuclear fuel by Russia and France in exchange for mechanisms which would make it harder for Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

Iran had previously rejected a similar deal, but this time Brazil will act as an honest broker, overseeing the process and acting as a mediator. Ahmadinejad's close relationship with outgoing Brazilian leader Lula undoubtedly helped to build trust, and is yet another sign of Brazil's ascendency on the international stage.

There's nothing strange about that, plenty of countries that were also-rans until recently have suddenly begun to take on huge importance in diplomatic and geopolitical terms. Look at China, Russia or India. All of those countries have, at various times in the past, been incredibly powerful and for historical, cultural, geographic or demographic reasons, have a 'natural' claim on being one of the big players. Their resurgence, is seen as a return to the natural order of things, especially in China's case.

None of that can be said of Brazil. It has no real history of engaging with the world. Culturally it is strong, but nowhere near as strong as India or China, both civilisations rather than nations. It is geographically isolated from the centres of power and while it has the fifth biggest population on Earth, it is still a very poor country with an appalingly unequal distribution of wealth. In all of these areas Brazil is moving forward, and in some cases is already stronger than most countries, but not to a degree that makes it an obvious great power.

Yet it is almost always referred to as part of the rising tide of developing countries which can no longer be ignored. It is a part of the informal BRIC (Brazil Russia India China) group of future economic heavyweights. It is considered by many to the be the planet's best hope for effective action being taken on global warming. It will host the 2014 World Cup and the  2016 Olympic games. During that World Cup, more neutrals will be up for Brazil than any other country. Like chips, the Beatles and Raymond, everybody loves Brazil.

Brazil is unique in this respect. Who else has genuinely close relations with both Venezuela and the US? With Iran and Germany? Russia and Poland? With no historical baggage to sour relations, Brazil has a huge amount of diplomatic credibility and the ambition to use it to its advanatge. Being able to take a large part of the credit for resolving the Iranian issue would be a big feather in Brazil's cap (even if they don't actually do much; the fact that Brazil's mere presence makes Iran more comfortable with the proposed deal says a lot). By refusing to back the idea of sanctions against Tehran, Brazil won browie points with much of the Muslim public without seriously alienating the West. If this proposal comes off, it will be a big step towards Brazil's long-term geopolitical goal: permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

It is generally accepted that the membership of the UNSC is now outdated and unrepresentative. At least one other country will have to be admitted, eventually. All the other potential candidates are problematic. Europe already has three members, so admitting Germany would irritate the rest of the world. China and South Korea would have serious reservations about Japan. Beijing would also likely object to India if it came down to it, though officially they are supportive of the idea. So Brazil is the obvious choice.

It will take years, probably decades for this goal to be achieved, but if and when it is, Brazil will go from an aspiring great power to a very real one, from a diplomatic lightweight to the voice of the developing world and the Southern Hemisphere. Not bad for a nation with none of the traditional strengths needed to become a big player.

26 April 2010

Is a bad response better than no response?

The Times is reporting that a torpedo or mine attack was almost certainly the cause of the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan last month. Seoul has thus far gone out of its way to avoid blaming North Korea for the incident, and will find themselves in a very awkward position should unequivocal proof emerge that Pyongyang is responsible. In fact, at the moment we seem to be in a bizarre twilight zone where South Korea is doing everything it can to avoid blaming North Korea for the sinking.  

From Seoul it probably seems that suffering occasional provocations (and doing some provoking of its own every so often) is a fair price to pay for peace. The South knows there is no chance it could be invaded again and it quite happy with its place in the world at present. Though the threat from the North is real, it isn’t existential and after more than 50 years of tense peace on the peninsula Seoul has learned to live with it.

The status quo has been good for South Korea since the end of quasi-fascist rule in the 80s, partly because sabre-rattling from the North has been ignored and nationalistic impulses within the South have been kept in check. Doing nothing is an option which has been taken for a long time now, to the benefit of Seoul.

However, just because something works once, twice, or dozens of times does not mean it will always work. The structure and decision-making processes of the North Korean leadership is opaque, so no one can be sure exactly who might have taken the decision to attack the Cheonan. The reasons for the attack are also unclear but if no retaliation is forthcoming, the lesson Pyongyang will learn is that the South has no stomach for a fight. In the short term that may not have any serious repercussions, but if the North begins to  seriously believe that the South won’t respond to any aggression, then there would be a serious risk of a miscalculation which could lead to war. For all his despotism, Kim Jong ill is fairly rational and very much interested in his own survival as leader, but frankly, any leader who can get away with sinking foreign ships to no consequence could be forgiven for believing they can get away with anything. Deterrence only works if it is credible, and it would be very, very dangerous to let North Korea believe it can torpedo the South’s navy when it feels like it.

On the other hand, retaliating in kind could lead to war too, for obvious reasons. If the Southern response made the North Korea's leadership believes it was under general attack, it really has only one tool with which to hit back: an enormous artillery range trained on Seoul which could inflict absolutely catastrophic damage on the city within the first few hours of a war. This trump card would have to be played very early on as it would be vulnerable to being overrun by American and Southern forces once they cross the border. If the North was to hesitate to react  to a general attack, it would be already have lost the war, so there would be no time to negotiate a climb-down or ceasefire. If war starts, it will start in earnest and won’t end until one side is totally defeated.Such a war would be the biggest war the planet has seen in a long time, not a quick and easy victory like Iraq or Georgia, and would cause hundreds of thousands if not millions of civilian and military deaths, and fundamentally change the security mechanisms of East Asia.

So Seoul’s dithering is understandable. There is no easy decision to make here, and no good decision either. At this very moment, the South Korean government will be hoping that they can be saved from responding by a convenient finding that North Korea wasn’t behind the attack. Without  government interference into the investigation that’s a pretty long shot, and if no such convenient finding is forthcoming, a difficult choice will have to be made.


19 April 2010

New poll, same old

A new BBC poll shows that public opinion of the United States is beginning to improve after years of decline during the presidency of George W. Bush. Some of this can be attributed to the ‘Obama Effect’, but other factors are at play here and say more about the media than the changing face of the balance of power across the globe today. Results concerning other countries are unsurprising and reflect not their behaviour, but rather their ability to control their public image.

First though, it’s important to examine some of the methodology used in the annual survey. 30,000 people in 33 countries were asked to rate various countries as having either a positive or negative influence on the world (how they rate their own country isn’t factored in). Different countries are selected every year (though some have been included every year), however this year has thrown up some geographical anomalies.

Every single country in North America was polled (including all six Central American nations), but only Brazil and Chile from South America. Almost every Western European nation’s opinions were included, but from Eastern Europe and the Balkans only Russia was consulted. Not one Middle Eastern or Central Asian nation was polled and only three Sub Saharan African nations made the cut. One needs to consider this when analysing these results.

Germany is the most positively-rated country in the survey. Not hugely surprising, as Berlin rarely offends anyone, is generous with aid and an incident in Afghanistan last year where its forces called in an air strike that killed around 100 civilians went largely unreported. It’s one of the great ironies of geopolitics that Germany has finally managed to dominate Europe and simultaneously become perhaps more popular than it ever has been.

Brazil is rated positively by 41% of respondents and negatively by 23%. One struggles to imagine what people imagine Brazil’s negative effects on the world to be, perhaps the inability of the state to fully protect the Amazon is a factor, but more likely is the fact that as Brazil becomes a bigger player on the world stage, it simply attracts more attention and thus more criticism.

This effect could also explain why positive views of China have dropped from 49% in 2005 to 34% today. Western media relentlessly portrays China in a negative light, but China still rates reasonably well. Unsurprisingly, African countries which have been large recipients of Chinese investment hold overwhelmingly positive (c. 70%) view of the People’s Republic. Oddly, no country has a poor a view of China as Italy does. Maybe Italians find Chinese politicians’ dull manner a poor contrast to their own Prime Minister’s behaviour.

Russia ranks poorly, as it has done since these polls were first taken.  Especially loathed in America, Mexico, the EU, South Korea and Japan, Moscow can at least be consoled by the fact that 55% of Chinese deem their giant northern neighbour to be a force for good. In the long run, this may be the most important statistic for Moscow. While Russia is viewed badly by the German and French publics, it has enough economic clout to ensure those countries’ governments seek warm relations with the Bear.

Predictably, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran are more-or-less universally despised. That won’t change in the foreseeable future and to be fair, none of those countries are trying to be loved. That western, democratic Israel is lumped in with a collapsing state, a dictatorship and a theocracy says a lot. Americans only just about see Israel positively overall, but this won’t worry the Israeli government as it knows its patron will always turn a blind eye to its treatment of Palestinians.

Which makes one wonder why so many people have a positive view of America.  Though Russia, Mexico, Germany, Turkey, China and Pakistan retain negative views of the US, its image has improved quite a bit in the last three years. Overall, 34% of respondents consider the US to have a negative influence on the world. 40% view America in a positive light, up from 27% in 2007. Could that be because the US has finally pulled out of Iraq as it promised to do? Maybe because Guantanamo Bay has been shut down? Perhaps the fact that civilians are no longer being killed in Afghanistan has something to do with it? Dramatic action on climate change? Proper dialogue with Iran instead of threats?

No, more than likely this can be explained by how little attention most people actually pay to international politics. Whatever your opinion on the US is, nothing has substantially changed about its foreign policies in the last three years apart from the manner in which the White House conducts itself. Despite having more control over media than any other country on Earth, America is still not a particularly popular country, but as long as almost no one is paying any attention, that doesn’t really matter.

12 April 2010

Counter-counter revolution in Kyrgyzstan

 
Most people outside Central Asia have no idea how to pronounce the name 'Kyrgyzstan', couldn't find it on a map and know nothing of its history, so it may seem somewhat surprising that its internal politics provided the biggest news story of last week.

One might be even more surprised to discover that the three biggest players in world politics, the US, China and Russia expend considerable diplomatic energy trying to keep the former SSR within their spheres of influence, or at least out of eachother's.  On the face of it, Kyrgyzstan doesn't seem very important in the greater scheme of things. It has virtually no oil or gas, it's economy is a basket case and it's military is pitiful, composed almost entirely of decrepit Soviet weapony.

As with all geopolitical topics though, Kyrgyzstan's geography must be considered. It is situated in an extraordinarily stratregically important location.
To the East is China's troublesome Xinjiang province. Like Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan is mostly Muslim, mostly Turkic and mostly poor. China has a big interest in ensuring that it's tiny neighbour doesn't become a base for seperatists or Islamicists. Beijing uses soft power, mostly trade, to maintain good terms with Bishkek. In future, maybe it can become a satellite state. For now, stability is the goal.

The US also has quite a big strategic interest in Kyrgyzstan. Manas Air Base, in the north of the country, is used to transport a huge amount of American soldiers to Afghanistan. in 2009, when Russia bribed the previous Kyrgyz government to close the base, Washington quickly agreed to triple the amount of rent it paid to keep the base open. Given how unreliable overland supply routes to Afghanistan are, America's reaction was a measure of just how important Manas is.

But going back on the deal with the Kremlin was a huge strategic error by the now-deposed government. The 'aid package' Russia gave was never explicitly tied to the eviction of the USAF, but both were announced on the same day in a manner that left it clear to everyone in no doubt that Moscow have been the driving force between the closure. Once the former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev had a change of heart and allowed the US to continue use of the base, things turned sour. How he could not have foreseen last week's event is anyone's guess, but soon enough Russian energy supplies became a lot more expensive, Russian-owned media turned hostile to the government, and the Kremlin recognised the new government almost before it had taken power.

Russia has numerous controls mechanisms over Bishkek, like the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Community customs union. Membership of all these organisations is genuinely voluntary, and beneficial for all states concerned. But Moscow still considers itself to have a sphere of influence in Central Asia, and has no intention of allowing either China or America chip away at it, however slowly. So from the Kremlin's point of view, something had to be done.

Here's what will happen. The new Kyrgyz government, led by Roza Otunbayeva will not evict the US. However, it will make it clear that the decision is not entirely theirs to make, and that were Russia to lean heavily on them, they could be left with no choice. Nikita Khruschev once said Berlin was '...the testicles of the west. When I want them to scream, I just squeeze Berlin'. On a much smaller scale, that is the principle behind Russia's interest in Kyrgyzstan. Now wouldn't be a good time to damage relations with Washingon, but it's nice to know it can be done if needs be.

There is also another benefit for Putin and Medvedev. Like almost all of Russia's 'near abroad', Kyrgyzstan likes to try and balance Russian influence by maintaing decent relations with other great powers. However, Moscow appears to be tiring of what it sees as its disloyal neighbours playing this game. Belarus aggravates The Kremlin by using the EU as leverage against Moscow, but Alexander Lukashenko will take a clear message from the events of the last week: You can only push it so far. If we can make this happen in Bishkek, we can do the same in Minsk. Like all the big players in world politics, Russia has bullying tendencies and likes to make examples. What better example than a President fleeing for his life thorugh the mountains of Central Asia?

29 March 2010

Good, but not great


After months of delay, the US and Russia have finally signed a new START treaty limiting both sides to 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons. In the mid-1980s, the two superpowers had roughly 60,000 warheads pointed at each other, so it would seem that this treaty is a real and tangible boost to the cause of nuclear disarmament. In reality, START changes little.
 
Not the likelihood or destructive power of a hypothetical war between Russia and America anyway, but things have changed for Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. Both Presidents have benefited politically from this treaty in strikingly similar ways.
 
Assuming Medvedev can get ratification from the Duma, START will be the first major policy he has realised independently from Vladimir Putin, showing that he may not be as much of a puppet as had previously been suspected. The Russian security establishment, or Siloviki, will not necessarily be happy with this treaty. The exact wording has yet to be finalised, but it looks likely that no link between START and American missile bases in Eastern Europe will be explicitly mentioned. In recent months, every time Medvedev said anything positive about how negotiations were going, Putin made a point of publicly stating that the possibility of a missile shield based in Romania and Bulgaria would be a big obstacle, and more recently Boris Gryzlov, a close ally of Putin and speaker of the Duma said that ratification would be dependent on such a link being made.
 
Up against such opposition, Medvedev would be looking at a major victory if he can sign this treaty into law in Prague this April. If he is considering running against Putin for the Presidency in 2012, then this is the opening shot of that competition. The treaty presents almost identical benefits and problems to Obama.
The ‘reset’ of relations with Russia had, up until now, been a bit of a joke. Nothing really happened and like practically every other major platform of Obama’s presidency until this month, there was no actual substance behind the oratory and charisma. Obama isn’t stupid though, and he realised that without some policy victories to point to, the Democrats would be absolutely hammered in November’s elections. Now he can add this to the Healthcare Reform Bill on his list of changes.
 
Undoubtedly, relations between Russia and the US are far better now than the Bush era. The two nations still have fundamentally opposed interests, and Moscow isn’t going to stop its drive to thwart the US at almost every turn because of a piece of paper, but at least some common ground has been found. Obama can legitimately say his negotiations have paid off. Ratification in the Senate isn’t a certainty either, but he will have an easier time of it than Medvedev. Most people would rather argue with Palin than Putin.
 
The timing is great too; now the US can keep a somewhat straight face when it says Iran shouldn’t build nuclear weapons at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in a fortnight. Few people familiar with US or Russian foreign policy will say they have the moral high ground while dealing with anyone, but this does give Obama some tenuous moral authority to lecture Iran, in the eyes of some people at least.
There are also fringe benefits for both sides. Missile batteries aren’t cheap to run (more of an issue for the Kremlin than the White House), so more money can be diverted into practical military applications like counter-terrorism units, modernisation of conventional forces, etc.
 
In reality though, 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads is more than enough to create the nightmarish nuclear holocaust that haunted the world in the early 1980s. Even with their reduced arsenals, both sides retain the ability to absolutely and utterly destroy each other and every other state on Earth several times over. Such a scenario is extremely unlikely, but in all likelihood it will never go away completely. The value in this treaty is political and diplomatic, not military; it matters little whether a country gets hit by 1,000 or 40,000 nuclear warheads.