Counter-counter revolution in Kyrgyzstan

 

Most people outside Central Asia have no idea how to pronounce the name 'Kyrgyzstan', couldn't find it on a map and know nothing of its history, so it may seem somewhat surprising that its internal politics provided the biggest news story of last week.

One might be even more surprised to discover that the three biggest players in world politics, the US, China and Russia expend considerable diplomatic energy trying to keep the former SSR within their spheres of influence, or at least out of eachother's.  On the face of it, Kyrgyzstan doesn't seem very important in the greater scheme of things. It has virtually no oil or gas, it's economy is a basket case and it's military is pitiful, composed almost entirely of decrepit Soviet weapony.

As with all geopolitical topics though, Kyrgyzstan's geography must be considered. It is situated in an extraordinarily stratregically important location.
To the East is China's troublesome Xinjiang province. Like Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan is mostly Muslim, mostly Turkic and mostly poor. China has a big interest in ensuring that it's tiny neighbour doesn't become a base for seperatists or Islamicists. Beijing uses soft power, mostly trade, to maintain good terms with Bishkek. In future, maybe it can become a satellite state. For now, stability is the goal.

The US also has quite a big strategic interest in Kyrgyzstan. Manas Air Base, in the north of the country, is used to transport a huge amount of American soldiers to Afghanistan. in 2009, when Russia bribed the previous Kyrgyz government to close the base, Washington quickly agreed to triple the amount of rent it paid to keep the base open. Given how unreliable overland supply routes to Afghanistan are, America's reaction was a measure of just how important Manas is.

But going back on the deal with the Kremlin was a huge strategic error by the now-deposed government. The 'aid package' Russia gave was never explicitly tied to the eviction of the USAF, but both were announced on the same day in a manner that left it clear to everyone in no doubt that Moscow have been the driving force between the closure. Once the former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev had a change of heart and allowed the US to continue use of the base, things turned sour. How he could not have foreseen last week's event is anyone's guess, but soon enough Russian energy supplies became a lot more expensive, Russian-owned media turned hostile to the government, and the Kremlin recognised the new government almost before it had taken power.

Russia has numerous controls mechanisms over Bishkek, like the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Community customs union. Membership of all these organisations is genuinely voluntary, and beneficial for all states concerned. But Moscow still considers itself to have a sphere of influence in Central Asia, and has no intention of allowing either China or America chip away at it, however slowly. So from the Kremlin's point of view, something had to be done.

Here's what will happen. The new Kyrgyz government, led by Roza Otunbayeva will not evict the US. However, it will make it clear that the decision is not entirely theirs to make, and that were Russia to lean heavily on them, they could be left with no choice. Nikita Khruschev once said Berlin was '...the testicles of the west. When I want them to scream, I just squeeze Berlin'. On a much smaller scale, that is the principle behind Russia's interest in Kyrgyzstan. Now wouldn't be a good time to damage relations with Washingon, but it's nice to know it can be done if needs be.

There is also another benefit for Putin and Medvedev. Like almost all of Russia's 'near abroad', Kyrgyzstan likes to try and balance Russian influence by maintaing decent relations with other great powers. However, Moscow appears to be tiring of what it sees as its disloyal neighbours playing this game. Belarus aggravates The Kremlin by using the EU as leverage against Moscow, but Alexander Lukashenko will take a clear message from the events of the last week: You can only push it so far. If we can make this happen in Bishkek, we can do the same in Minsk. Like all the big players in world politics, Russia has bullying tendencies and likes to make examples. What better example than a President fleeing for his life thorugh the mountains of Central Asia?

The Future of Ukraine

As Yulia Tymoshenko lost a vote of no confidence last week, the last vestiges of the Orange Revolution left the Supreme Rada with her. Viktor Yanukovych is now left with the difficult task of replacing her, but on some level he must feel relieved that he is now firmly in charge. The worst may be yet to come.

Ukraine is in a location that ensures it will always be of interest to bigger powers than itself. Sandwiched between a giant which sees the country as almost part of itself (hence the nickname ‘Little Russia’) and an EU which is obliged to leave the door open to all European countries, Ukraine is also a stakeholder in the Black Sea and close and involved enough in the Caucasus to send weapons to there, as it did during the 2008 war between Saakashvilli and Putin.

For a little while more, it will also serve as a transit route for Siberian gas on its way to heat homes and power businesses in Europe. This has guaranteed that Moscow will have an economic as well as strategic interest in Ukraine, but will soon change. The South Stream gas pipeline, due online in 2015, will bypass Ukraine and give Russia a freer hand in dealing with Kiev.

This wouldn’t restrict Ukraine so much if it had somewhere else to turn, but it doesn’t.  Its economy shrank by 15% last year, which won’t exactly do much for its prospects of joining the EU. Brussels won’t ever shut the door completely, but membership, which seemed an imminent possibility when Viktor Yuschenko became President in 2005, now looks a long way off. Germany hates having to bail Greece out; it’s not going to accept a potentially worse case into the Union any time soon. A few loans will likely be forthcoming from Europe, but not in the volumes that would be required to steady the ship. Nor is the cavalry coming over the hill. The majority of country is dead against joining NATO, so there is no prospect of economic benefits as a result of becoming a US ally.

So while he won’t make the country a Russian vassal, Yanukovych will need a lot of help from Moscow. This won’t be too bitter of a pill to swallow for him; his support base is overwhelmingly in the Russian-speaking areas in the east of the country, centred on Donetsk. He speaks far better Russian than Ukrainian. But he is no agent of the Kremlin, so will seek good terms for his country.

One mechanism for achieving this could be the Customs Union of which Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members. Realistically, membership would cede economic control to the Kremlin to a degree, but it would also make gas cheaper, an essential factor in the recovery of heavy industry in the east of the country. Russia would be only too delighted to welcome its little brother into this club. And Ukraine has other hands to play. It could get some decent loans or subsidies if the lease on the Russian naval base in Crimea was extended. Then there is Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It cost Russia $50m to get the Pacific micronation of Nauru to recognise them, and while that payoff wouldn’t be scaled to size (if it was, Ukraine could expect to receive $1,437,209,000,000), Kiev would still reap lucrative rewards if they followed suit. The most that could be offered to Russia would be accession to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, but Yanukovych will avoid this if at all possible, because it would destroy any grudging acceptance he has in the west of the country.

So here’s what will happen. Yanukovych will make a few gestures, like giving the Russian language official status, retracting Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera’s Hero of Ukraine award and dropping any suggestion of ever joining NATO. Medvedev and Putin will reciprocate with some loans and investment, and small gestures will go on like this for a while. But eventually, Moscow will demand something more concrete, and in the absence of a miraculous economic recovery, Kiev will be over a barrel and obliged to provide.

Why won’t Russia deliver the S-300s?

RIA Novosti recently reported that Russia is addressing technical issues which have long delayed the delivery of five S-300 Anti-Aircraft batteries to Iran. No doubt Tehran will be encouraged by this, but five years after the contract for the potent AA system was signed, they must be beginning to wonder if the weapons are ever actually going to arrive.

The deal was agreed in 2005, at the height of Bush’s anti-Iranian rhetoric, when an attack on the Islamic Republic seemed like an imminent possibility, and made perfect sense for both sides at the time. Putin was beginning to lose patience with Bush, and didn't want to see another US puppet established in the Gulf. Iran’s armed forces had nothing that could stand up to an American or Israeli strike, and needed some form of deterrent. Enter the S-300, the Russian equivalent of Patriot missiles.

But the AA systems never materialised. Moscow realised that the threat of delivering to Iran could be used as leverage against the US. Putin decided that this card would be best kept up his sleeve, only to be played when an ace was needed.

Then Obama got elected. For the first few months of his presidency, there was genuine optimism that US-Russia relations could improve, so the Kremlin reasoned that irritating Iran was a risk worth taking if the pay off was a workable, if not friendly, relationship with the US. Gradually though, the ‘reset’ petered out, and although some progress was made on START 2 talks, Russia has only ever expressed vague support for weak sanctions on Tehran, and knows full well China will block even that. There was no serious rapprochement. Still, why hadn’t the AA systems arrived in Iran?

Russia basically wants to have its cake and eat it. Its position has dramatically improved in the last ten years, but it still needs diplomatic leverage and sees the US as its principal adversary. While the US is making noises about deploying a new missile shield in the Balkans, Russia will hold on to its ability to respond in kind. While America still has a presence in central Asia, Russia will want to keep an ally in the Gulf. Russia’s foreign policy is more anti-American than any other major player, including China. Providing the US’ biggest enemy in the region with the means to defend itself is completely in line with Putin’s drive to squeeze the US out of central Asia. On the other hand, if it can secure an implicit assurance from Washington that NATO won’t be expanding any time soon, or work with the Americans to limit Chinese power, it won’t aggravate its adversary needlessly. If Dmitry Medvedev has more power than most people think, this may be a serious possibility.

But it can’t keep all sides dangling for ever. Some recent events indicate it may have decided to drop Iran and try and cultivate a serious relationship with Saudi Arabia. Russia has no ideological qualms about arming one theocracy, so it would be quite comfortable switching to another. However, that may be just an insurance policy, or a means to make Iran more pliable. There are serious dangers involved in reneging on the S-300 sales to Tehran.

First, it would seriously harm Moscow’s reputation as an arms supplier, and the timing of this would be disastrous, coming as it does just as Rosoboronexport’s hardware is finding new markets. Venezuela, Vietnam and other countries will think twice about placing orders which may not be filled. Sales of the new 5th generation PAK FA fighter, Russia’s most prestigious military project in years, would likely suffer.

Secondly, Iran could increase the volume of gas it sells, depressing prices and harming Russia’s economy. There would be no good time for this to happen, but now would be a particularly bad one, with Russia taking a long time to emerge from recession and the Kremlin still trying to find funds to modernise Russian infrastructure and the military.

For almost seven years now, we have heard an Israeli or American air strike on Iran will happen any day. But this situation cannot go on indefinitely; Israel must soon decide whether it can live with a nuclear, if not a nuclear-armed Iran. Russia must decide where to place its bets. If S-300s played the major role in successfully repelling an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, Russian-American relations would plummet. If, on the other hand, Russia allows Iran to be bombed, its can forget about its relationship with Tehran. It’s not as if Iran doesn’t have anywhere else to turn; it has a potentially far more powerful patron to the east whose appetite for energy and investment potential could be the long-term solution to Tehran’s economic problems.

My guess is that Iran will be allowed to dangle for a while yet, but unless the US can offer some serious compensation for leaving Iran open to attack, the S-300s will find their way across the Caspian Sea sooner or later. It's hard to imagine what that compensation could be; Georgia and Ukraine aren't going to be joining NATO for the foreseeable future no matter what happens, the WTO will eventually admit Russia in even if the US doesn't particularly like it, and the days when the White House could hint at a 'colour revolution' being funded in the Russian Federation are long gone. For a country supposedly in terminal decline, Russia has a lot of sway over the most important region in the world.