Options for Turkey

More than any other country today, Turkey has options. It's in a situation many countries would envy, having myriad choices with which to shape its own future and decide how it identifies itself. If it can remain relatively stable, it has a bright future ahead.

So what exactly are those options? Well, a few of them would have seemed unthinkable even a few years ago. Quiet, strategic diplomacy has opened some doors; storming out of meetings has opened others.

The meeting in question was the World Economic Forum in Davos last year. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won praise in the Muslim world after angrily leaving a public session of the summit following a row with Israeli President Shimon Peres about the ongoing attack on the Gaza Strip. This was the first indication that there might be some serious problems in the previously cosy relationship between the two countries. Relations have since deteriorated further, and it appears that this may be in part an effort on the part of Ankara to position itself as a champion of the Muslim world. Erdoğan’s party, the AKP, is relatively religious by Turkish standards, and may have decided to align itself with its neighbours to the south, a strategy sometimes called Neo-Ottomanism (more out of laziness than any relevance to history).

This would of course damage relations with the US, but they have peaked anyway. Several factors have conspired to damage relations between Washington and Ankara recently. In 2003, the Turks refused to allow the US to invade Iraq from its territory. Understandable, considering the last thing Turkey wanted was an independent or autonomous Kurdistan on its doorstep (to all intents and purposes Iraqi Kurdistan is independent now), but subsequent remarks by Donald Rumsfeld which blamed Turkey for the strength of the resistance made Ankara question the value of the alliance. Then two weeks ago the US took a big step towards recognising the Armenian genocide, infuriating Ankara and straining the alliance even further. Obama will try to block full recognition, but the fact that the resolution got this far makes the Turks take a very dim view of the Americans. There are no longer any real military threats to the Turks, so while the US will remain a partner, its importance will diminish in future.

Not as much as it would if Turkey became a member of the EU. That’s a big ‘if’ though, and it looks less likely all the time. There are many reasons for the EU to keep Turkey out, few to let them in. Turkey would be initially the second biggest and eventually the biggest nation in Europe. Why would Germany, France and the UK dilute their own power by letting another heavyweight in? Also, while the EU officially supports total civilian control of the Turkish military, in reality they know that if that actually happened, Turkey could become an Islamicised state, not a popular concept in Brussels. A more likely outcome to the saga is Turkey eventually being given some sort of associate membership. Deep down they must know they aren’t going to be admitted, but withdrawing their application now would be counterproductive, so they must maintain the facade of chasing full membership.

So while there has been deterioration towards the west, none of it is irreversible or catastrophic. Israel needs to keep at least one Muslim country onside, so it won’t sever ties. As the US needs the use of bases in Turkey, particularly the airbase at Incirlik, Obama will do everything he can to avoid offending his ally. The EU doesn’t want its neighbour as a member, but doesn’t want to close the door completely, so it will find a compromise.

Things look brighter to the east. The border with Armenia was recently reopened with Russia’s blessing. Motivating this is a desire to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey sides with Azerbaijan, but knows realistically that as long as Armenia is backed by Russia, only a diplomatic solution is an option, and that won’t happen while Ankara is completely at odds with Yerevan. If the situation could be resolved, Turkey would have a stable if not friendly neighbour on its border, a grateful and oil-rich ally in Azerbaijan.

Russia would also be pleased. And that’s no bad thing, considering how much gas comes from Siberia to Anatolia. Moscow is Ankara’s biggest trading partner, and a possible fall-back should relations with the US ever take a spectacular dive. If Turkey ever did want to align itself with the Bear, it could consider recognising Abkhazia. Turkey is host to a large Abkhaz diaspora, and could conceivably challenge Russia as the tiny Republic’s benefactor down the line. Moscow and Ankara probably have too many areas of competition to ever become true allies, but the potential for a mutually beneficial arrangement is there, should Turkey decide to pursue it.

There are also indications that Iran could be a possible target for Turkish diplomacy. President of Turkey Abdullah Gül was quick to recognise Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the legitimate winner of June’s elections. While there is no drive to emulate the Iranian Theocratic system in Turkey, there is no desire to have the Kurds in Iran achieve autonomy as they did in Iraq either, so for that reason Turkey would not welcome the collapse of the Iranian state. There are extensive trading links between the two nations, and despite some rivalry for the affections of Syria, if a regional arms race can be avoided there would be potential for the two countries to work together.

But the most profitable (both literally and metaphorically) area where Turkey could expand its influence is also the unlikeliest. Far-fetched though it might sound, there would be some real and tangible benefits if Turkey could normalise relations with the Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Kurdistan is a de facto nation now. It’s not going away, but as long as it isn’t providing any real support to independence for Kurds in Turkey, it’s no threat. It does, however, have huge oil reserves and the most likely market for that oil is Europe. One look at a map tells that for this to come to fruition, Turkey would have to agree to be a transit hub for this oil. That can be a lucrative business, and also one which gives political influence. If Turkey could help develop the economy of a Kurdish state and profit from it, it would have to its south a relatively stable nation who it could strangle economically if it so choose. For this to happen there would have to be a fundamental shift in Turkey’s view of the Kurds, but pragmatism almost always trumps ideology, and if the oil transport revenues looked big enough, it would become plausible.

So the ball is in Turkey’s court in many respects. The spectre of army coups and the destruction of the secular basis of the nation are a reality, but the recent arrest on suspicion of coup-mongering of dozens of army officers shows the government finally feels confident enough to take on the armed forces. If it can maintain internal stability, Turkey has the freedom to decide its own future, a privilege few nations enjoy. 

The Future of Ukraine

As Yulia Tymoshenko lost a vote of no confidence last week, the last vestiges of the Orange Revolution left the Supreme Rada with her. Viktor Yanukovych is now left with the difficult task of replacing her, but on some level he must feel relieved that he is now firmly in charge. The worst may be yet to come.

Ukraine is in a location that ensures it will always be of interest to bigger powers than itself. Sandwiched between a giant which sees the country as almost part of itself (hence the nickname ‘Little Russia’) and an EU which is obliged to leave the door open to all European countries, Ukraine is also a stakeholder in the Black Sea and close and involved enough in the Caucasus to send weapons to there, as it did during the 2008 war between Saakashvilli and Putin.

For a little while more, it will also serve as a transit route for Siberian gas on its way to heat homes and power businesses in Europe. This has guaranteed that Moscow will have an economic as well as strategic interest in Ukraine, but will soon change. The South Stream gas pipeline, due online in 2015, will bypass Ukraine and give Russia a freer hand in dealing with Kiev.

This wouldn’t restrict Ukraine so much if it had somewhere else to turn, but it doesn’t.  Its economy shrank by 15% last year, which won’t exactly do much for its prospects of joining the EU. Brussels won’t ever shut the door completely, but membership, which seemed an imminent possibility when Viktor Yuschenko became President in 2005, now looks a long way off. Germany hates having to bail Greece out; it’s not going to accept a potentially worse case into the Union any time soon. A few loans will likely be forthcoming from Europe, but not in the volumes that would be required to steady the ship. Nor is the cavalry coming over the hill. The majority of country is dead against joining NATO, so there is no prospect of economic benefits as a result of becoming a US ally.

So while he won’t make the country a Russian vassal, Yanukovych will need a lot of help from Moscow. This won’t be too bitter of a pill to swallow for him; his support base is overwhelmingly in the Russian-speaking areas in the east of the country, centred on Donetsk. He speaks far better Russian than Ukrainian. But he is no agent of the Kremlin, so will seek good terms for his country.

One mechanism for achieving this could be the Customs Union of which Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members. Realistically, membership would cede economic control to the Kremlin to a degree, but it would also make gas cheaper, an essential factor in the recovery of heavy industry in the east of the country. Russia would be only too delighted to welcome its little brother into this club. And Ukraine has other hands to play. It could get some decent loans or subsidies if the lease on the Russian naval base in Crimea was extended. Then there is Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It cost Russia $50m to get the Pacific micronation of Nauru to recognise them, and while that payoff wouldn’t be scaled to size (if it was, Ukraine could expect to receive $1,437,209,000,000), Kiev would still reap lucrative rewards if they followed suit. The most that could be offered to Russia would be accession to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, but Yanukovych will avoid this if at all possible, because it would destroy any grudging acceptance he has in the west of the country.

So here’s what will happen. Yanukovych will make a few gestures, like giving the Russian language official status, retracting Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera’s Hero of Ukraine award and dropping any suggestion of ever joining NATO. Medvedev and Putin will reciprocate with some loans and investment, and small gestures will go on like this for a while. But eventually, Moscow will demand something more concrete, and in the absence of a miraculous economic recovery, Kiev will be over a barrel and obliged to provide.

Doublespeak Season Has Started Early This Year

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said recently that European ‘pacifism’ is a danger to global peace, and part of a trend which constitutes a large political and cultural problem. His remarks came after the Dutch government collapsed following a row between coalition partners about deployments to Afghanistan, resulting in the total withdrawal of Dutch forces (2,000 soldiers) from the NATO mission.

Gates’ statement can ostensibly be seen as a warning to other European countries not to follow suit, but in reality it reflects a general feeling in Washington that Europe is not pulling its weight. The feeling in Brussels is that Europe will decide for itself how much weight it should pull, and in what direction.

During the cold war, the US was happy for Western Europe to remain militarily weak so the White House could dictate policy toward the USSR. Reasoning that as long as America footed the bill for deterring a real or imagined Soviet threat, it could ensure that no NATO member could have an independent policy toward the Soviet Union. This was a largely successful strategy, keeping both sides happy until the end of the cold war.

But as EU integration has accelerated, Western Europe has become inclined to take an independent, if not always divergent, attitude to foreign policy. Differing approaches on Iraq, Russia and Turkey have made it apparent that European and American interests will not always coincide. In theory this is acceptable to the US, but in practice Washington can barely hide its frustration at Western European lack of enthusiasm for fighting an unwinnable war against the Taliban, taking a belligerent line with Moscow, keeping Turkey’s EU application on the long finger and so on.

American power is much weakened since its heyday in the 90s, and Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed how limited even huge military power is. With its economy in tatters, the US would like the wealthy states it imagines itself to have saved during World Wars one and two and the cold war to begin to pull their weight by increasing military commitment to the various and ceaseless conflicts America finds itself embroiled in. Bush’s plan for the US to go it alone failed spectacularly, and Washington now realises that ‘New Europe’ is of little use as an ally.

What Gates and co fail to understand is that Europe has had a totally different experience of war than the US, and does not share the same mindset as their American partners. Even militaristic Europeans know that there is no threat to the EU from Russia or Iran and no appetite among the European public for power projection that would involve deploying large amounts of EU soldiers abroad. There is no messianic desire or ability to ‘spread democracy’ or selectively depose authoritarian governments on this side of the Atlantic.

As the EU moves towards becoming a serious power in its own right, of course it will become more assertive internationally, but that doesn’t mean it need become more aggressive. Europe is secured against external attack as it is, and already spends more on its military than Russia and China combined. If Europe was to increase its spending as Gates has requested, it would have a corresponding increase in influence on the world stage. And that would be unacceptable to the US, as the lead up to the Iraq war showed. America wants allies like Poland and Georgia, ones that will play along with its adventures without asking too many questions or raising too many objections. If the EU ever does end up having a unified military, it won’t be used to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the Pentagon.