China still calls the shots in Korea

As expected, China has refused to blame North Korea for the sinking of the warship Cheonan at a summit with the Japanese and South Korean leaders. Though China and North Korea both abandoned Marxism long ago, their ties still run deep enough for Beijing to keep an open mind on the incident.

However, as with almost every geopolitical situation these days, pragmatism  and not ideology is the motivation. At present, China benefits from its quasi-alliance with the DPRK in several ways and is not willing to destroy it to no benefit. War, which would destroy North Korea, would be catastrophic for several reasons.

First and foremost, China wants to avoid having an American-allied, unified Korea on its border. If that came to pass, China’s already questionable ability to respond to a Taiwanese declaration of independence would disappear altogether. Deterring the US navy from intervening in Taiwan would be one thing, dealing with an American force which had a land border with China another. The bad publicity that China inc. accrues as a result of its links with Pyongyang is worth keeping the US away from the border. A scenario where China and the Americans are fighting in Korea won’t happen in the foreseeable future but Beijing’s entire strategy revolves around long-term planningd and to ignore the value of having an ally in such a situation would be remiss in the extreme.

Secondly, the PRC props North Korea up because it simply couldn’t afford to let it collapse. If it did, China would have to cope with hundreds of thousands, if not million of refugees. Also, the impact of sudden reunification on the South Korean economy would be devastating and would in turn seriously damage China’s trade with Seoul. The regional economy would be destabilised and would take years to recover. Politburo members planning China’s rise to supremacy assume and desire no more big economic shocks and will avoid them happening on their doorstep at all costs.

Thirdly, North Korea gives the PRC leverage over the west and the Americans in particular. Selling more arms to Taiwan? Well, forget about us supporting anti-DPRK Security Council resolutions. Criticising our monetary policies? Don’t be surprised if a shipment of new tanks finds its way to the Korean People’s Army. All the big players use small countries as leverage against each other, and Pyongyang is more than happy to play the part. There is of course a risk that the tail could wag the dog, but as long as North Korea depends on China for fuel, food and money, it won’t overstep any lines China may draw in the sand.

The nature of the situation on the peninsula means there is always a risk of a war starting accidentally. One of the regular small-scale firefights on the DMZ could get out of hand. A new naval clash could escalate before either country’s government has a chance to calm the situation down. However, those dangers have existed since 1953, and all concerned parties have learned to live with it. The risks can be minimised but never eliminated completely. As long as the two countries are divided, war is always a possibility.

But it would take an accident or miscalculation to start a new war. No one, not even Kim or the US actually wants the situation to turn hot. Russia and China have both called for further investigations into the Cheonan incident, which means they are still hoping to delay any punishment the rest of the world may want to visit on DPRK. Moscow and Beijing may believe that if they can delay punitive action for long enough, tempers will cool and the incident can be largely consigned to the history books, along with the hundreds of other occasions when the two Koreas have killed eachother’s military personnel since the ceasefire in 1953. Deep down, South Korea and the US are probably hoping for that to happen too.

No one is claming that the US and South Korea would immediately attack the north if China assented, but the fact that the PRC isn’t distancing itself from Pyongyang means there will be no deliberate war. Seoul would be devastated. North Korea would be destroyed. Relations between China and the US would become just as strained as they did in 1950. For war to start deliberately, someone has to benefit from it. This time, no matter who won, everybody would lose.

Futenma flip-flop

 

 

After eight months of public humming and hawing, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has finally made a decision regarding his pre-election promise to move the US airbase at Futenma out of Okinawa and possibly Japan altogether: he will do neither.

Hatoyama had promised the Japanese electorate that he would make up his mind by May, but the fact that the deadline has been met will do little to sway current public opinion of him. Having swept to power last September (the first time in 55 years that his Democratic Party had won), Hatoyama found himself positioned to make real changes to the landscape of Japanese politics. With approval ratings in the mid-70s and a solid mandate to change how Japan interacts with the world, the new PM immediately promised a 'less subservient' relationship with the US and vowed to tear up his predecessor’s agreement to make few changes to the Futenma base arrangements.

The problem is that Futenma is immensely unpopular not just with Okinawans, but with the Japanese people in general. Built smack bang in the middle of a city, it causes traffic jams, noise, huge amounts of pollution and crime. The crime factor became acute when three American marines gang raped a 12 year old girl in 1996, turning public opinion sharply against the continued US presence.

So, once Hatoyama took power, the world expected him to make real changes. With a general power shift towards East Asia occurring, might Japan now want to get closer to China or perhaps pursue a path in between Washington and Beijing? Might Japan recognise Futenma as a cold war relic? Would it change its constitution to allow itself to build a proper military, and allow it to stop relying on an increasingly shaky-looking America for security?

None of that happened. Having considered dozens of plans, gone back and forth to Okinawa, consulted the Pentagon and even been publicly humiliated by the Mayors of two cities which refused to absorb elements of the bases, the PM has finally relented, admitted that the vast majority of the base's functions will continue as they do presently, apologised or his failures, promised to do better in future and asked for understanding. He isn't getting it though, as his approval ratings now stand at about 23%.

So, why does Hatoyama appear intent on committing political suicide? Upper house elections in July will likely see the Democratic Party take a hammering as a result of the Futenma fiasco. Calls are already growing for the PM to resign. His coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, has threatened to withdraw from government altogether over the issue. A popular decision this is not.

No single reason stands out,but in all likelihood Hatoyama decided to keep the base on Okinawa because of a combination of the following factors;

    * Fear of the US. Though undoubtedly a declining force, America is still the most powerful country on Earth, and nowadays expends more diplomatic energy on the Asian Pacific area than anywhere else. A variety of carrots and sticks were probably used by the Americans, but the fact that Hatoyama backed down shows they still exert enough of a grip on Tokyo to keep them in line.

    * Fear of China. Though the idea of China attacking Japan may seem laughable to most people, military leaders have to plan for every eventuality. Japan’s own armed forces are strong, but they wouldn’t last long against the People's Liberation Army. Retaining an American presence would act as a strong deterrent in any hypothetical future conflict.

    * Fear of North Korea. No one would have been more overjoyed had Japan moved the US base out of the country altogether than North Korea, but their sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan 6 weeks ago will have done plenty to convince Tokyo than North Korea is a serious threat.Hatoyama has already cited this as one of the reasons the base must stay, though realistically the decision had probably already been taken at that stage.

Hatoyama must calculate that public anger will die down soon enough to keep him in his job. If it doesn’t, his successor will have taken heed of the lesson and will try to avoid making the same mistakes. Paradoxically, caving in over Futenma could eventually make the Japanese-US relationship more genuinely equal. 

A rising diplomatic superpower

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this week agreed to back a Brazilian-led initiative to resolve the row over his country's nuclear power industry. The plan involves Tehran being supplied with nuclear fuel by Russia and France in exchange for mechanisms which would make it harder for Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

Iran had previously rejected a similar deal, but this time Brazil will act as an honest broker, overseeing the process and acting as a mediator. Ahmadinejad's close relationship with outgoing Brazilian leader Lula undoubtedly helped to build trust, and is yet another sign of Brazil's ascendency on the international stage.

There's nothing strange about that, plenty of countries that were also-rans until recently have suddenly begun to take on huge importance in diplomatic and geopolitical terms. Look at China, Russia or India. All of those countries have, at various times in the past, been incredibly powerful and for historical, cultural, geographic or demographic reasons, have a 'natural' claim on being one of the big players. Their resurgence, is seen as a return to the natural order of things, especially in China's case.

None of that can be said of Brazil. It has no real history of engaging with the world. Culturally it is strong, but nowhere near as strong as India or China, both civilisations rather than nations. It is geographically isolated from the centres of power and while it has the fifth biggest population on Earth, it is still a very poor country with an appalingly unequal distribution of wealth. In all of these areas Brazil is moving forward, and in some cases is already stronger than most countries, but not to a degree that makes it an obvious great power.

Yet it is almost always referred to as part of the rising tide of developing countries which can no longer be ignored. It is a part of the informal BRIC (Brazil Russia India China) group of future economic heavyweights. It is considered by many to the be the planet's best hope for effective action being taken on global warming. It will host the 2014 World Cup and the  2016 Olympic games. During that World Cup, more neutrals will be up for Brazil than any other country. Like chips, the Beatles and Raymond, everybody loves Brazil.

Brazil is unique in this respect. Who else has genuinely close relations with both Venezuela and the US? With Iran and Germany? Russia and Poland? With no historical baggage to sour relations, Brazil has a huge amount of diplomatic credibility and the ambition to use it to its advanatge. Being able to take a large part of the credit for resolving the Iranian issue would be a big feather in Brazil's cap (even if they don't actually do much; the fact that Brazil's mere presence makes Iran more comfortable with the proposed deal says a lot). By refusing to back the idea of sanctions against Tehran, Brazil won browie points with much of the Muslim public without seriously alienating the West. If this proposal comes off, it will be a big step towards Brazil's long-term geopolitical goal: permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

It is generally accepted that the membership of the UNSC is now outdated and unrepresentative. At least one other country will have to be admitted, eventually. All the other potential candidates are problematic. Europe already has three members, so admitting Germany would irritate the rest of the world. China and South Korea would have serious reservations about Japan. Beijing would also likely object to India if it came down to it, though officially they are supportive of the idea. So Brazil is the obvious choice.

It will take years, probably decades for this goal to be achieved, but if and when it is, Brazil will go from an aspiring great power to a very real one, from a diplomatic lightweight to the voice of the developing world and the Southern Hemisphere. Not bad for a nation with none of the traditional strengths needed to become a big player.