Good, but not great

After months of delay, the US and Russia have finally signed a new START treaty limiting both sides to 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons. In the mid-1980s, the two superpowers had roughly 60,000 warheads pointed at each other, so it would seem that this treaty is a real and tangible boost to the cause of nuclear disarmament. In reality, START changes little.
 

Not the likelihood or destructive power of a hypothetical war between Russia and America anyway, but things have changed for Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. Both Presidents have benefited politically from this treaty in strikingly similar ways.
 

Assuming Medvedev can get ratification from the Duma, START will be the first major policy he has realised independently from Vladimir Putin, showing that he may not be as much of a puppet as had previously been suspected. The Russian security establishment, or Siloviki, will not necessarily be happy with this treaty. The exact wording has yet to be finalised, but it looks likely that no link between START and American missile bases in Eastern Europe will be explicitly mentioned. In recent months, every time Medvedev said anything positive about how negotiations were going, Putin made a point of publicly stating that the possibility of a missile shield based in Romania and Bulgaria would be a big obstacle, and more recently Boris Gryzlov, a close ally of Putin and speaker of the Duma said that ratification would be dependent on such a link being made.
 

Up against such opposition, Medvedev would be looking at a major victory if he can sign this treaty into law in Prague this April. If he is considering running against Putin for the Presidency in 2012, then this is the opening shot of that competition. The treaty presents almost identical benefits and problems to Obama.
The ‘reset’ of relations with Russia had, up until now, been a bit of a joke. Nothing really happened and like practically every other major platform of Obama’s presidency until this month, there was no actual substance behind the oratory and charisma. Obama isn’t stupid though, and he realised that without some policy victories to point to, the Democrats would be absolutely hammered in November’s elections. Now he can add this to the Healthcare Reform Bill on his list of changes.
 

Undoubtedly, relations between Russia and the US are far better now than the Bush era. The two nations still have fundamentally opposed interests, and Moscow isn’t going to stop its drive to thwart the US at almost every turn because of a piece of paper, but at least some common ground has been found. Obama can legitimately say his negotiations have paid off. Ratification in the Senate isn’t a certainty either, but he will have an easier time of it than Medvedev. Most people would rather argue with Palin than Putin.
 

The timing is great too; now the US can keep a somewhat straight face when it says Iran shouldn’t build nuclear weapons at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in a fortnight. Few people familiar with US or Russian foreign policy will say they have the moral high ground while dealing with anyone, but this does give Obama some tenuous moral authority to lecture Iran, in the eyes of some people at least.
There are also fringe benefits for both sides. Missile batteries aren’t cheap to run (more of an issue for the Kremlin than the White House), so more money can be diverted into practical military applications like counter-terrorism units, modernisation of conventional forces, etc.
 

In reality though, 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads is more than enough to create the nightmarish nuclear holocaust that haunted the world in the early 1980s. Even with their reduced arsenals, both sides retain the ability to absolutely and utterly destroy each other and every other state on Earth several times over. Such a scenario is extremely unlikely, but in all likelihood it will never go away completely. The value in this treaty is political and diplomatic, not military; it matters little whether a country gets hit by 1,000 or 40,000 nuclear warheads.

 

Israel and the US: hand in hand or chained together?

The announcement of further Israeli colonisation of East Jerusalem should come as a shock to no one, but its timing must have felt like a slap in the face to Joe Biden. The measured and calculated public ‘row’ which followed, which was called the worst crisis between the US and Israel in 35 years only illustrates the point that the US won’t abandon Israel, come what may.

Racist crackpots like to imagine that Jews control the media, but if that was true, surely they would have had an easier time of it these last few weeks. There has been almost universal condemnation of their settlement extensions and bombing of Gaza, and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon made a point of condemning the blockade of Palestine during his visit there. But it’s beginning to look like Israel no longer cares what the rest of the world thinks.

From their point of view, why should they? The Israeli elite knows that it is seen as the bad guy across the world, and barring an unprecedented attack on Israel, that’s not going to change. Why should they exert effort fighting a losing battle for public opinion? It really doesn’t affect life for the average Israeli citizen if people in Europe, China or Brazil perceive them as the aggressors. All that matters is security. And Israel’s is guaranteed.

Contrary to popular perception, Israel doesn’t rely on the US for security. Its armed forces are by far the strongest in the region, and while they do primarily use American equipment, they also buy from Europe and are developing an indigenous arms industry. Even if the Israeli Defence Forces were overwhelmed and Arab armies approached their borders, Israel could threaten to obliterate Damascus, Riyadh and Beirut with just a few of the 200-odd nuclear weapons they have. Tehran gaining a handful of nukes would make no difference to that equation; Iran would be committing national suicide if it used WMDs on Israel.

But Israel does rely on the US to keep the UN Security Council from passing resolutions against it. The relationship is essentially a diplomatic one for Israel, conducted through their lobby groups in Washington (Like any nation with a large diaspora, Israeli lobby groups are disproportionately powerful. Ireland and Armenia punch above their weight in a similar manner).

The lobby groups don’t have to do much lobbying though, as the US wouldn’t dream of dropping Israel or even becoming an honest broker in the Middle East.  The embarrassment America suffers for its support is more than offset by the fact that Israel is the best proxy Washington can buy. Direct intervention in the Middle East is not going to be a realistic option for the US for some time. In the meantime, it can rely on Israel to do its bidding, be that bombing Iran or assassinating Hamas members, because their objectives broadly coincide.
American policy has been so oriented towards Israel for so long that it could no longer change direction even if it wanted to, and it doesn’t want to. Israel knows The White House doesn’t really care how it acts in the occupied territories, and that no existential threat towards the Jewish State actually exists. Both sides are locked together, and that suits them perfectly. Nothing to see here.

 

Options for Turkey

More than any other country today, Turkey has options. It's in a situation many countries would envy, having myriad choices with which to shape its own future and decide how it identifies itself. If it can remain relatively stable, it has a bright future ahead.

So what exactly are those options? Well, a few of them would have seemed unthinkable even a few years ago. Quiet, strategic diplomacy has opened some doors; storming out of meetings has opened others.

The meeting in question was the World Economic Forum in Davos last year. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won praise in the Muslim world after angrily leaving a public session of the summit following a row with Israeli President Shimon Peres about the ongoing attack on the Gaza Strip. This was the first indication that there might be some serious problems in the previously cosy relationship between the two countries. Relations have since deteriorated further, and it appears that this may be in part an effort on the part of Ankara to position itself as a champion of the Muslim world. Erdoğan’s party, the AKP, is relatively religious by Turkish standards, and may have decided to align itself with its neighbours to the south, a strategy sometimes called Neo-Ottomanism (more out of laziness than any relevance to history).

This would of course damage relations with the US, but they have peaked anyway. Several factors have conspired to damage relations between Washington and Ankara recently. In 2003, the Turks refused to allow the US to invade Iraq from its territory. Understandable, considering the last thing Turkey wanted was an independent or autonomous Kurdistan on its doorstep (to all intents and purposes Iraqi Kurdistan is independent now), but subsequent remarks by Donald Rumsfeld which blamed Turkey for the strength of the resistance made Ankara question the value of the alliance. Then two weeks ago the US took a big step towards recognising the Armenian genocide, infuriating Ankara and straining the alliance even further. Obama will try to block full recognition, but the fact that the resolution got this far makes the Turks take a very dim view of the Americans. There are no longer any real military threats to the Turks, so while the US will remain a partner, its importance will diminish in future.

Not as much as it would if Turkey became a member of the EU. That’s a big ‘if’ though, and it looks less likely all the time. There are many reasons for the EU to keep Turkey out, few to let them in. Turkey would be initially the second biggest and eventually the biggest nation in Europe. Why would Germany, France and the UK dilute their own power by letting another heavyweight in? Also, while the EU officially supports total civilian control of the Turkish military, in reality they know that if that actually happened, Turkey could become an Islamicised state, not a popular concept in Brussels. A more likely outcome to the saga is Turkey eventually being given some sort of associate membership. Deep down they must know they aren’t going to be admitted, but withdrawing their application now would be counterproductive, so they must maintain the facade of chasing full membership.

So while there has been deterioration towards the west, none of it is irreversible or catastrophic. Israel needs to keep at least one Muslim country onside, so it won’t sever ties. As the US needs the use of bases in Turkey, particularly the airbase at Incirlik, Obama will do everything he can to avoid offending his ally. The EU doesn’t want its neighbour as a member, but doesn’t want to close the door completely, so it will find a compromise.

Things look brighter to the east. The border with Armenia was recently reopened with Russia’s blessing. Motivating this is a desire to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey sides with Azerbaijan, but knows realistically that as long as Armenia is backed by Russia, only a diplomatic solution is an option, and that won’t happen while Ankara is completely at odds with Yerevan. If the situation could be resolved, Turkey would have a stable if not friendly neighbour on its border, a grateful and oil-rich ally in Azerbaijan.

Russia would also be pleased. And that’s no bad thing, considering how much gas comes from Siberia to Anatolia. Moscow is Ankara’s biggest trading partner, and a possible fall-back should relations with the US ever take a spectacular dive. If Turkey ever did want to align itself with the Bear, it could consider recognising Abkhazia. Turkey is host to a large Abkhaz diaspora, and could conceivably challenge Russia as the tiny Republic’s benefactor down the line. Moscow and Ankara probably have too many areas of competition to ever become true allies, but the potential for a mutually beneficial arrangement is there, should Turkey decide to pursue it.

There are also indications that Iran could be a possible target for Turkish diplomacy. President of Turkey Abdullah Gül was quick to recognise Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the legitimate winner of June’s elections. While there is no drive to emulate the Iranian Theocratic system in Turkey, there is no desire to have the Kurds in Iran achieve autonomy as they did in Iraq either, so for that reason Turkey would not welcome the collapse of the Iranian state. There are extensive trading links between the two nations, and despite some rivalry for the affections of Syria, if a regional arms race can be avoided there would be potential for the two countries to work together.

But the most profitable (both literally and metaphorically) area where Turkey could expand its influence is also the unlikeliest. Far-fetched though it might sound, there would be some real and tangible benefits if Turkey could normalise relations with the Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Kurdistan is a de facto nation now. It’s not going away, but as long as it isn’t providing any real support to independence for Kurds in Turkey, it’s no threat. It does, however, have huge oil reserves and the most likely market for that oil is Europe. One look at a map tells that for this to come to fruition, Turkey would have to agree to be a transit hub for this oil. That can be a lucrative business, and also one which gives political influence. If Turkey could help develop the economy of a Kurdish state and profit from it, it would have to its south a relatively stable nation who it could strangle economically if it so choose. For this to happen there would have to be a fundamental shift in Turkey’s view of the Kurds, but pragmatism almost always trumps ideology, and if the oil transport revenues looked big enough, it would become plausible.

So the ball is in Turkey’s court in many respects. The spectre of army coups and the destruction of the secular basis of the nation are a reality, but the recent arrest on suspicion of coup-mongering of dozens of army officers shows the government finally feels confident enough to take on the armed forces. If it can maintain internal stability, Turkey has the freedom to decide its own future, a privilege few nations enjoy. 

The Future of Ukraine

As Yulia Tymoshenko lost a vote of no confidence last week, the last vestiges of the Orange Revolution left the Supreme Rada with her. Viktor Yanukovych is now left with the difficult task of replacing her, but on some level he must feel relieved that he is now firmly in charge. The worst may be yet to come.

Ukraine is in a location that ensures it will always be of interest to bigger powers than itself. Sandwiched between a giant which sees the country as almost part of itself (hence the nickname ‘Little Russia’) and an EU which is obliged to leave the door open to all European countries, Ukraine is also a stakeholder in the Black Sea and close and involved enough in the Caucasus to send weapons to there, as it did during the 2008 war between Saakashvilli and Putin.

For a little while more, it will also serve as a transit route for Siberian gas on its way to heat homes and power businesses in Europe. This has guaranteed that Moscow will have an economic as well as strategic interest in Ukraine, but will soon change. The South Stream gas pipeline, due online in 2015, will bypass Ukraine and give Russia a freer hand in dealing with Kiev.

This wouldn’t restrict Ukraine so much if it had somewhere else to turn, but it doesn’t.  Its economy shrank by 15% last year, which won’t exactly do much for its prospects of joining the EU. Brussels won’t ever shut the door completely, but membership, which seemed an imminent possibility when Viktor Yuschenko became President in 2005, now looks a long way off. Germany hates having to bail Greece out; it’s not going to accept a potentially worse case into the Union any time soon. A few loans will likely be forthcoming from Europe, but not in the volumes that would be required to steady the ship. Nor is the cavalry coming over the hill. The majority of country is dead against joining NATO, so there is no prospect of economic benefits as a result of becoming a US ally.

So while he won’t make the country a Russian vassal, Yanukovych will need a lot of help from Moscow. This won’t be too bitter of a pill to swallow for him; his support base is overwhelmingly in the Russian-speaking areas in the east of the country, centred on Donetsk. He speaks far better Russian than Ukrainian. But he is no agent of the Kremlin, so will seek good terms for his country.

One mechanism for achieving this could be the Customs Union of which Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members. Realistically, membership would cede economic control to the Kremlin to a degree, but it would also make gas cheaper, an essential factor in the recovery of heavy industry in the east of the country. Russia would be only too delighted to welcome its little brother into this club. And Ukraine has other hands to play. It could get some decent loans or subsidies if the lease on the Russian naval base in Crimea was extended. Then there is Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It cost Russia $50m to get the Pacific micronation of Nauru to recognise them, and while that payoff wouldn’t be scaled to size (if it was, Ukraine could expect to receive $1,437,209,000,000), Kiev would still reap lucrative rewards if they followed suit. The most that could be offered to Russia would be accession to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, but Yanukovych will avoid this if at all possible, because it would destroy any grudging acceptance he has in the west of the country.

So here’s what will happen. Yanukovych will make a few gestures, like giving the Russian language official status, retracting Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera’s Hero of Ukraine award and dropping any suggestion of ever joining NATO. Medvedev and Putin will reciprocate with some loans and investment, and small gestures will go on like this for a while. But eventually, Moscow will demand something more concrete, and in the absence of a miraculous economic recovery, Kiev will be over a barrel and obliged to provide.

Doublespeak Season Has Started Early This Year

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said recently that European ‘pacifism’ is a danger to global peace, and part of a trend which constitutes a large political and cultural problem. His remarks came after the Dutch government collapsed following a row between coalition partners about deployments to Afghanistan, resulting in the total withdrawal of Dutch forces (2,000 soldiers) from the NATO mission.

Gates’ statement can ostensibly be seen as a warning to other European countries not to follow suit, but in reality it reflects a general feeling in Washington that Europe is not pulling its weight. The feeling in Brussels is that Europe will decide for itself how much weight it should pull, and in what direction.

During the cold war, the US was happy for Western Europe to remain militarily weak so the White House could dictate policy toward the USSR. Reasoning that as long as America footed the bill for deterring a real or imagined Soviet threat, it could ensure that no NATO member could have an independent policy toward the Soviet Union. This was a largely successful strategy, keeping both sides happy until the end of the cold war.

But as EU integration has accelerated, Western Europe has become inclined to take an independent, if not always divergent, attitude to foreign policy. Differing approaches on Iraq, Russia and Turkey have made it apparent that European and American interests will not always coincide. In theory this is acceptable to the US, but in practice Washington can barely hide its frustration at Western European lack of enthusiasm for fighting an unwinnable war against the Taliban, taking a belligerent line with Moscow, keeping Turkey’s EU application on the long finger and so on.

American power is much weakened since its heyday in the 90s, and Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed how limited even huge military power is. With its economy in tatters, the US would like the wealthy states it imagines itself to have saved during World Wars one and two and the cold war to begin to pull their weight by increasing military commitment to the various and ceaseless conflicts America finds itself embroiled in. Bush’s plan for the US to go it alone failed spectacularly, and Washington now realises that ‘New Europe’ is of little use as an ally.

What Gates and co fail to understand is that Europe has had a totally different experience of war than the US, and does not share the same mindset as their American partners. Even militaristic Europeans know that there is no threat to the EU from Russia or Iran and no appetite among the European public for power projection that would involve deploying large amounts of EU soldiers abroad. There is no messianic desire or ability to ‘spread democracy’ or selectively depose authoritarian governments on this side of the Atlantic.

As the EU moves towards becoming a serious power in its own right, of course it will become more assertive internationally, but that doesn’t mean it need become more aggressive. Europe is secured against external attack as it is, and already spends more on its military than Russia and China combined. If Europe was to increase its spending as Gates has requested, it would have a corresponding increase in influence on the world stage. And that would be unacceptable to the US, as the lead up to the Iraq war showed. America wants allies like Poland and Georgia, ones that will play along with its adventures without asking too many questions or raising too many objections. If the EU ever does end up having a unified military, it won’t be used to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the Pentagon.