22 February 2010


Mind-boggling timing of Taiwan weapons sales makes you wonder…



The Dalai Lama’s visit to the White House came less than two weeks after the US decided to OK a huge arms deal with Taiwan. It also came a few weeks before the US does its best to convince China that it should back heavy sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. Either American priorities aren’t what they appear to be, or all is not as it seems…

Iran’s revelation in September 09 that it is building a nuclear reactor in Qom seemed to have changed Medvedev’s, if not Putin’s mind on some form of sanctions. Iran was forced to make the admission because if they didn’t, the west was going to ‘out’ them anyway. Western leaders expressed mock horror (their intelligence agencies had probably known about it for a long time, projects of this size aren’t easy to hide), Israel was furious and even Russia began to dither from its support for Iran. Only China now stood in the way.

But the PRC would take some convincing. It buys a lot of gas and oil from Iran, and is reluctant to endanger its energy supplies, none of which are particularly secure (except its own coal production) or reliable. The two ancient nations have the potential to be of huge benefit to each other during China's rise.

So why would the US agree to host the Dalai Lama at this sensitive time? Well, there are several reasons. This trip was originally scheduled for last October, but was postponed by Obama so as not to sour a trip to Beijing. But he can defer so many times before it becomes damaging for him at home. The right-wing lunatic fringe led by Sarah Palin, Rush Limbaugh and Glen Beck have already accused Obama of letting the US get pushed around on the international scene, and a second postponement would appear to confirm the charge that he can’t stand up to Beijing. Hu's opinion is important, but not as many Americans listen to Hu as listen to Glen Beck.

Another factor is how the Tibetan ‘spiritual leader’ is perceived in the western world. Years of support for an independent or autonomous Tibet by celebrities may be well-intentioned, but ignores what that Tibet would look like. Despite the fact that the Dalai Lama would be an unelected quasi-theocratic leader, many in Europe and North America imagine him to be an Asian Nelson Mandela type figure, albeit one who occasionally shills iPods. Obama would take a lot of flack if he appeared to be taking the Chinese Communist Party’s side over a cuddly, smiling monk because of economic concerns.

So it’s not too hard to see why the White House may have decided that they can’t and shouldn’t postpone this visit again. The weapons sales to Taiwan though, are baffling.

Since 1979, the US has been legally obligated to sell Taiwan weapons with which to defend itself from any attempt to reintegrate it into the People’s Republic. This leaves the island in a pretty secure position, despite the imbalance of forces between itself and the mainland. The terrain of the island and the weakness of the People’s Liberation Navy mean China would have its work cut out invading. It is generally assumed that if China did attempt such an adventure, the US would intervene anyway (I question whether they would, given what that could escalate in to). As long as Taiwan doesn’t declare independence, the PRC seems resigned to the situation. Every so often the US upgrades the island’s military capability, stressing that any weapons sold are of a defensive nature (they usually are), China makes a token protest, and back to square one.

These days though, the balance of power has shifted.Beijing won’t accept being ignored, and can retaliate to American provocations. When the deal was announced, Chinese state news agency Xinhua published a condemnation, saying the sale 'is a wrong decision’, ‘Frankly speaking, US arms sales to Taiwan have become a chronic disease that has been disturbing China-US ties for a long period of time’ and (the deal) ‘exposes the US usage of double standards and hypocrisy on major issues related to China's core interests’. If the State Department had expected the usual weak protest, they must have been sorely disappointed.

The reasons for the timing of the sale can only be guessed at. One possibility is that the US totally underestimated China’s reaction, but this is unlikely given how assertive the PRC has become in the last few years. Maybe Washington hoped, as they often seem to, that other countries will just see things as they do, and refuse to connect Iran and Taiwan out of some sense of good sportsmanship. Maybe the Obama administration’s diplomacy is as inept as the Bush administration’s was.

But there is another possibility. The Iranian state is shakier than it has been since the revolution, but the opposition still isn’t strong enough to topple the President, never mind the Supreme Leader. The US would like to apply pressure, but knows from experience that sanctions don’t topple leaders with large public support (as Khamenei has) and a loyal and dedicated security force. After Iraq, the last thing the US is going to do is attack Iran without a proper causus belli, so while the US publicly pushes for harsh sanctions on the Islamic Republic, it’s not beyond the bounds of possibility that it would welcome an Israeli attack on Iran which might convince elements in the country that overthrowing a weakened Revolutionary Guard and state could be easier than rebuilding nuclear infrastructure. It would be unlikely to work, but no more unlikely than sanctions.



17 February 2010

Why won’t Russia deliver the S-300s?









RIA Novosti recently reported that Russia is addressing technical issues which have long delayed the delivery of five S-300 Anti-Aircraft batteries to Iran. No doubt Tehran will be encouraged by this, but five years after the contract for the potent AA system was signed, they must be beginning to wonder if the weapons are ever actually going to arrive.


The deal was agreed in 2005, at the height of Bush’s anti-Iranian rhetoric, when an attack on the Islamic Republic seemed like an imminent possibility, and made perfect sense for both sides at the time. Putin was beginning to lose patience with Bush, and didn't want to see another US puppet established in the Gulf. Iran’s armed forces had nothing that could stand up to an American or Israeli strike, and needed some form of deterrent. Enter the S-300, the Russian equivalent of Patriot missiles.

But the AA systems never materialised. Moscow realised that the threat of delivering to Iran could be used as leverage against the US. Putin decided that this card would be best kept up his sleeve, only to be played when an ace was needed.

Then Obama got elected. For the first few months of his presidency, there was genuine optimism that US-Russia relations could improve, so the Kremlin reasoned that irritating Iran was a risk worth taking if the pay off was a workable, if not friendly, relationship with the US. Gradually though, the ‘reset’ petered out, and although some progress was made on START 2 talks, Russia has only ever expressed vague support for weak sanctions on Tehran, and knows full well China will block even that. There was no serious rapprochement. Still, why hadn’t the AA systems arrived in Iran?

Russia basically wants to have its cake and eat it. Its position has dramatically improved in the last ten years, but it still needs diplomatic leverage and sees the US as its principal adversary. While the US is making noises about deploying a new missile shield in the Balkans, Russia will hold on to its ability to respond in kind. While America still has a presence in central Asia, Russia will want to keep an ally in the Gulf. Russia’s foreign policy is more anti-American than any other major player, including China. Providing the US’ biggest enemy in the region with the means to defend itself is completely in line with Putin’s drive to squeeze the US out of central Asia. On the other hand, if it can secure an implicit assurance from Washington that NATO won’t be expanding any time soon, or work with the Americans to limit Chinese power, it won’t aggravate its adversary needlessly. If Dmitry Medvedev has more power than most people think, this may be a serious possibility.

But it can’t keep all sides dangling for ever. Some recent events indicate it may have decided to drop Iran and try and cultivate a serious relationship with Saudi Arabia. Russia has no ideological qualms about arming one theocracy, so it would be quite comfortable switching to another. However, that may be just an insurance policy, or a means to make Iran more pliable. There are serious dangers involved in reneging on the S-300 sales to Tehran.


First, it would seriously harm Moscow’s reputation as an arms supplier, and the timing of this would be disastrous, coming as it does just as Rosoboronexport’s hardware is finding new markets. Venezuela, Vietnam and other countries will think twice about placing orders which may not be filled. Sales of the new 5th generation PAK FA fighter, Russia’s most prestigious military project in years, would likely suffer.

Secondly, Iran could increase the volume of gas it sells, depressing prices and harming Russia’s economy. There would be no good time for this to happen, but now would be a particularly bad one, with Russia taking a long time to emerge from recession and the Kremlin still trying to find funds to modernise Russian infrastructure and the military.

For almost seven years now, we have heard an Israeli or American air strike on Iran will happen any day. But this situation cannot go on indefinitely; Israel must soon decide whether it can live with a nuclear, if not a nuclear-armed Iran. Russia must decide where to place its bets. If S-300s played the major role in successfully repelling an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, Russian-American relations would plummet. If, on the other hand, Russia allows Iran to be bombed, its can forget about its relationship with Tehran. It’s not as if Iran doesn’t have anywhere else to turn; it has a potentially far more powerful patron to the east whose appetite for energy and investment potential could be the long-term solution to Tehran’s economic problems.

My guess is that Iran will be allowed to dangle for a while yet, but unless the US can offer some serious compensation for leaving Iran open to attack, the S-300s will find their way across the Caspian Sea sooner or later. It's hard to imagine what that compensation could be; Georgia and Ukraine aren't going to be joining NATO for the foreseeable future no matter what happens, the WTO will eventually admit Russia in even if the US doesn't particularly like it, and the days when the White House could hint at a 'colour revolution' being funded in the Russian Federation are long gone. For a country supposedly in terminal decline, Russia has a lot of sway over the most important region in the world.